

Becoming Taiwanese Muslims: Ethnic, National, and Religious Identity Transformations In a Muslim Minority

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Legend

CMA Chinese Muslim Association

DPP Democratic Progressive Party

KMT Kuomintang

PRC People's Republic of China

ROC Republic of China

Abstract

This research project is focused on contemporary identity issues facing Muslim Mainlanders in Taiwan. Muslim Mainlanders are an ethnic subgroup of the Mainlanders who fled to Taiwan after the communist take-over of China. This project argues that multiple communal identities interact and are pragmatically used by Muslim Mainlanders depending on social context. Specifically, ethnicity, nationality and religion are identities which individuals understand according to unique social experiences. This research provides an opportunity to update the literature on the Islamic community in Taipei.

The thesis argues that global processes are causing an Islamic revival. This transformation is occurring alongside the movement of Mainlanders to identify as Taiwanese. Both movements are nationalistic because they provide opportunities to move beyond a heritage which originates in China.

Ce projet de recherche se concentre sur les questions d'identité auxquels est confrontée la Continentaux musulmans à Taiwan. Continentaux musulmans sont un sous-groupe ethnique des Continentaux qui ont fui à Taiwan après la prise de contrôle communiste de la Chine. Ce projet fait valoir que plusieurs identités communautaires interagissent et sont utilisés de façon pragmatique par Continentaux musulmans selon le contexte social. Plus précisément, l'origine ethnique, la nationalité et la religion sont des identités dont les individus comprennent selon les expériences sociales uniques. Cette recherche offre la possibilité de mettre à jour la documentation sur la communauté islamique à Taipei.

La thèse soutient que les processus mondiaux sont à l'origine d'un renouveau islamique. Cette transformation se produit aux côtés du mouvement des Continentaux à s'identifier comme taiwanais. Les deux mouvements sont nationalistes, car ils offrent des possibilités d'aller au-delà d'un patrimoine qui est originaire de Chine.

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Glossary

Arabic words used in the text

adhan The Islamic call to prayer

Allahu akbar Muslim expression meaning “God is great” or “God is greater”

Arab One who self-identifies as an Arab; speaks Arabic as a native language

Asr The third of five daily prayers, performed in the late afternoon

assalaamu alaykum Universal greeting for Muslims meaning “peace be upon you”

da’wa The necessary action of Muslims to promote Islam

Dhuhr The second of five daily prayers, performed at noon

du’a praying in the form of making supplications to God

Eid al-Fitr Holy day ending the month of *Ramadan*

Eid Mubarak “Blessed Eid”

Fajr The first of five daily prayers, performed between dawn and sunrise

al-Fatiha The opening *sura* of the *Qur’an*

Hadith The collected writings about the life of the Prophet Muhammad

Hajj Pilgrimage to the holy places of Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam

halal meaning lawful, usually associated with specific dietary guidelines

Hafiz A term used for someone who has completely memorized the *Qur’an*

al-Hamdulillah “Praises be to God” an everyday Muslim expression meaning usually said in relation to an achievement

hijab “Covering,” commonly used to refer to modern head coverings worn by Muslim women

iftar The evening meal during *Ramadan* in which Muslims break their fast

imam A Muslim who will lead prayers at a mosque

inshallah “God willing,” an common expression used in the hope that future events may come to pass

Isha the fifth of five daily prayers, performed in the evening

Islam religion delivered to the last prophet Muhammad and articulated in the *Qur’an*

itikaf A period of retreat in a Mosque for the last ten days of *Ramadan*

Janazah Islamic prayer for the dead

Juma Islamic congregational prayer occurring on Fridays in a mosque

ka'ba Sacred enclosure at the center of the Great Mosque in Mecca

Maghrib The fourth of five daily prayers, performed upon sunset

masjid Mosque

Qibla Direction of prayer for Muslims around the world

Qur'an The Holy Book of Islam

Ramadan The ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar in which Muslims fast

rakaat A cycle of prayer, each cycle begins with the *al-Fatiha*

ruku Bowing during prayer

salat Prayer

Sawm Fasting during the month of Ramadan, one of the five pillars of Islam

suhoor Meal eaten in the morning before fasting

sujud Prostration during prayer

Sunna The practices of the Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime

sura Chapters from the *Qur'an*

Tahajud A night prayer performed by Muslims

takbir Arabic term for the phrase “*Allahu akbar*”

taqiyah Religious prayer cap worn by Muslim men

Tarawih A nightly prayer offered during Ramadan

Umma The world community of Muslims

wa alaykum assalaam The standard response to the greeting *assalaamu alaykum*. Meaning “and to you”

Witr A nightly prayer offered during Ramadan

wudu Ablutions; washing oneself before prayer or touching the *Qur'an*

zakah The obligation to donate to charity, one of the five pillars of Islam

Mandarin words used in the text

Benshengren Collective term for the Hoklo and Hakka ethnic groups in Taiwan

benshengren “Those from outside the province”

da “big”

guo “land” or “country”

Han Collective identity of Chinese people who make up 98% of the population of Taiwan and 91% of the population of China

Hua Term which refers to Chinese people

Huaqiao overseas Chinese

Huaxia see *Hua*

Hui A Muslim minority group in China, one of 56 official *minzu* in the People’s Republic of China

jiao “religion”

jie “street”

Kejiaren Hakka people

Lamian “pulled noodles”

Minnanren Hoklo people

minzu A term referring to a collective group of people as either a race, nation, or ethnicity

Musilin “Muslim”

neidi the inner lands, referring to China

ni hao hello

ren “People(s)”

rongmin Veterans designated by Chiang Kai-shek as “glorious citizens”

shenshang Merchant elite in southern China during the early 20th century

suibian doing as one pleases

Tangren “People of the Tang dynasty”

tu religious believer

waiyuoren “People from outside the country”

Waishengren Ethnic group in Taiwan made up of those who came to the island from China after 1945

waishengren “People from outside the province”

xiao “small”

Yisilan “Islam”

youjidui guerrilla fighters

Yuanzhumin Taiwanese Aborigines

zhong “middle”

Zhonghua Chinese

Zhongguo China

Zhongguo Huijiao Xiehui the Chinese Muslims Association

Introduction

The Taipei Grand Mosque, situated across from Da'an park, stands as a visible symbol of Islam in Taiwan. Occasionally buses drop tourists off to see its inside. If they arrived during one of the five daily prayers they will see an eclectic mix of Muslims from different nations. Tourists would notice different styles of dress, and if they had a keen eye, slight differences in styles of prayer. They would hear various languages spoken by those at the mosque. These probably would have been Mandarin, English, Arabic, French, Burmese, or Indonesian. The visitors would be hard-pressed to find someone at the Taipei Grand Mosque who couldn't speak at least three of these languages.

Tourists arriving on Sundays would have seen a group of Indonesian university students taking turns speaking through a microphone about Islam. Also in the prayer hall, would have been Taiwanese children reciting the *Fatiha* (the opening chapter of the *Qur'an*). Around one o'clock in the afternoon on Fridays is when the mosque sees the most activity. More than five hundred brothers and sisters crowd into the mosque in order to pray *Juma*. Every Friday after prayer there is a festive atmosphere. Muslims will eat lunch in the dining hall or stay outside to socialize. They may buy Halal meats for the week ahead. Muslim restaurants in the area will shut down for the day and temporarily move to the mosque.

My original motivation for this research began while living in the beautiful city of Yangzhou, China, from 2006-2008. While there, I became interested in the diversity found in China, especially in the Hui Muslim population. Yangzhou, like every major city in China, has many Lanzhou *lamian* (hand-pulled noodle) restaurants in which *Hui* from Qinghai, Gansu and elsewhere live and work. I returned to Canada with the intention of attending the University of

Ottawa Anthropology program. Once completed, I transitioned straight into the Master's program hoping to do research with lamian restaurant owners in Lanzhou. Over time this project eventually transitioned to a project on the Chinese Muslim population in Taipei. This was partly due to a desire to conduct fieldwork in a location completely new to me, as I had never been to Taiwan previously.

While in Ottawa planning the final stages of my departure for field research to Taipei, I received advice from a Taiwanese scholar. If I were to come to Taiwan to do research on Taiwanese Muslims, the best place to look would be the Muslim graves which dot the hills behind Taipei Medical University. The Chinese Muslims who came to Taiwan with the retreating Kuomintang (KMT) government did not have many children. The children whom they did have are largely assimilated into the identity of their non-Muslim mothers. This advice is actually not too far from the reality in Taiwan. A common topic of conversation for Muslims in Taipei is the fact that so few second and third generation Mainlanders have maintained a belief in Islam. During the many hours I spent at the two mosques in Taipei, I often spoke to both Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese about this situation. The proof, I was told, that many had left Islam were the increasingly frequent funerals of first generation Muslim Mainlanders who were brought to the mosque by their children, who themselves knew nothing about Islam.

In Taiwan, ethnic categorisation has been divided into four groups since the 1990's. These are the indigenous Austronesian (原住民, *Yuanzhumin*), Hoklo (閩南人, *Minnanren*), Hakka (客家人, *Kejiaren*) and Mainlanders (外省人, *Waishengren*). There is also a dichotomy present which opposes "native" Taiwanese (本省人, *Benshengren*), made up of Hoklo and Hakka, with Mainlanders. The reason the Hoklo and Hakka are "native" Taiwanese is that these two groups migrated from China to Taiwan between the 17th and 18th centuries. The Mainlanders

are those Taiwanese who arrived from mainland China with the KMT between 1945 and 1956 (Le Pesant, 2011). It is estimated that 20,000 of the over one million mainlanders that arrived in Taiwan were Muslim (Gowing, 1970; Pillsbury, 1973).

Aside from a PhD dissertation written by Barbara Pillsbury in 1973, very little has been written in the English literature about Muslims in Taiwan. In the last forty years, since the PhD of Pillsbury, there has been a vast amount of literature written about Chinese Muslims (Lipman, 1997; Rudelson, 1997; Gladney, 1998, 2004; Atwill, 2005; Broomhall, 2007; Dillon, 2009). However, this has not translated to any analysis on how Muslims from China adapted to their new social context in Taiwan.

According to Pillsbury (1973), the Chinese Muslims who came to Taiwan with the KMT were part of a distinct ethnic group. While living in China, Muslims were designated as Hui by Sun Yat-sen when he outlined the “Five Peoples of China”¹. In Taiwan, many first generation Muslims still acknowledge that they are Hui². Although there are fewer Muslim Mainlanders than previously, there are still many second and third generation Mainlanders who do practice Islam. This thesis looks at how they have adapted their Islamic identity as well as their ethnic and national ones to fit the context of contemporary Taiwan.

Taiwan currently provides an important area of research for the social sciences. Since the 1990’s, countless studies have been conducted looking at how Mainlanders are coping with an identity crises in the face of rising Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwanese nationalism is the growing assertion by Native Taiwanese in a Taiwanese ethnic boundary, distinct from a Chinese ethnic

¹ The term *Hui* was adopted by Sun Yat-sen to categorize all Muslim. It gained widespread usage as a label for the Muslims in China during the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368). Gladney (1998) believes that “Hui” originates as a Chinese translation of the name for the Uyghur Muslims, *Huihu* or *Huihe* (30).

² I refer to those born in China who migrated to Taiwan between 1945 and 1956 as first generation Mainlanders.

category, along with the desire for an independent Taiwanese nation-state (Rigger, 2006: 7). As of yet, few studies have looked into how second and third generation Mainlander identities differ from that of their parents. Looking at the differences between these groups provides a fascinating case for identity studies. First generation Mainlanders arrived in Taiwan with the retreating KMT government. To a large extent, they were soldiers who did not have the option of staying in China. They believed that Taiwan was only a temporary stop, and that they would soon return to the mainland. For these reasons first generation Mainlanders did not develop a strong identity as Taiwanese.

Unlike the first generation Mainlanders who left parents, wives and even children in China, the second and third generation Mainlanders were born in Taiwan and did not leave a homeland behind. They were not forced to re-settle, believing that China was the true homeland and Taiwan only a temporary stop. This research is also unique in that it looks at Muslims as a subgroup within the Mainlander category. Yang and Chang (2010) have argued that previous Mainlander studies have neglected the history and agency of those being studied (122). They believe that a focus on the diversity present within the ethnic group would provide a more nuanced approach to a discussion about their identities in Taiwan.

This research started as a project to look at the Chinese Islamic minority in Taiwan as a subgroup of the Mainlander ethnic category. Initially I proposed asking the question, what does Chinese heritage mean in regards to Muslim Mainlander identity? What I have come to realize is that by asking this question I cannot ignore what it means to be Taiwanese and Muslim. The Mainlander and Native Taiwanese ethnic divide has been an ongoing social and political question for the last few decades. Countless research has been done producing literature trying to determine what this divide means to each group. Typically, the question asked is whether or not

individuals identify more strongly with China or Taiwan or both. In the past this has often been posed as a choice between unification and independence. This question ignores the fact that many *Waishengren* are not concerned with unifying or gaining independence because being Taiwanese is a lived reality.

My research points to Muslim Mainlanders as identifying strongly as Taiwanese. However, this does not mean that they do not believe themselves to be Chinese. In fact, it seems that a dual identity is present in which it is possible to be both Taiwanese and Chinese. It will be shown that these two categories are not mutually exclusive. In order to explain this I posit that for Muslim Mainlanders, Taiwanese is a national identity while Chinese is an ethnic one. Being ethnically Chinese is not unique to Taiwan; however, being Taiwanese is unique to Taiwan and differentiates those who practice Islam on the island from those who practice it on the mainland.

A second argument I wish take make is that what it means to be a Muslim in Taiwan has changed since the Hui first came to the island with Chiang Kai-shek. Using Barbara Pillsbury's 1973 PhD dissertation, I make comparisons and draw conclusions on why Islam in Taiwan has moved from a "Chinese Islam" to a "Taiwanese Islam." Involved in this process is the growing recognition that Taiwanese Muslims have of belonging to a global religion. This is demonstrated through the belief that they themselves have that their ancestors practiced an Islam influenced by Chinese culture. What I am referring to here is the loss of consciousness in a religious identity which entails ethnic boundaries, the Hui *minzu*. Furthermore, there is a desire by many Muslim Mainlanders to "correct" their Islamic practices, seen to have incorporated Chinese non-Islamic practices.

Through an analysis of second and third generation Taiwanese Muslims' views of ethnicity, nationality and religion, this thesis will provide insights into the meanings associated

with these collective identities. I aim to show that the two processes of change described above are currently underway for Taiwanese Muslims; that of becoming more Muslim and that of becoming more Taiwanese. They are becoming more Muslim because they are being exposed to interpretations of Islam which are stricter in their practice. Second and third generation Taiwanese Mainlanders find it increasingly difficult to practice Islam in the way their fathers and grandfathers have. In a changing Islamic environment, they are faced with the challenge of adapting to Islam as it is now being practiced by the majority of Muslims in Taiwan. The second argument will address the ethnic divide between *Waishengren* and *Benshengren*. I will show that second and third generation Mainlanders are Taiwanese and believe themselves to be such. These two arguments are linked and will come together to demonstrate the emergence of a category of Taiwanese Muslims.

My hope for this paper is to adequately update the current literature on the state of Muslims in Taipei. Research on this subject has been lacking in the English academic literature since Pillsbury (1973) published her PhD dissertation. Secondly, I aim to introduce various Taiwanese scholars who have been working on this topic to an English audience. I also feel any discussion of Islam that rejects negative stereotypes as a point of departure is important. In popular media, the Muslim has been so stereotyped and simplified as to make The Human invisible. The irony is that it is those who are not Muslim who claim to have the clearest understanding of Islam. The reality for the Muslim community in Taipei is quite different. What is a Muslim and what Islam ought to be is under constant negotiation through words and actions. As opposed to what some believe, Islam is not an object which is taken wholesale by everyone who chooses to bring it into their lives. Instead, it is always interpreted into a social context which fits into the lives of Muslims. That being said, this research can be seen as a *da'wa*

(promotion of Islam) of sorts. As an anthropologist I hope to highlight the ordinary lives of Muslims living in Taipei in order to make familiar their interpretations and implementations of Islam.

Chapter One will provide an overview of the literature on Mainlander identity and on Islam in Taiwan. In Chapter Two I will discuss the history of migrations of Chinese to Taiwan as well as Muslims to Taiwan. The third and fourth chapters will deal specifically with the research question. Chapter three provides the bulk of ethnographic detail as it deals specifically with question of Islamic identity in Taiwan. It will show that when Chinese Muslims came to Taiwan they still had strong connections to an Islam that was in some ways “Chinese.” A major change has been to go from an ethnic minority, Hui, to a religious one. In chapter four I will return to the Mainlander identity debate to provide my own insights. I will draw parallels between the desire by Muslim Mainlanders to emphasize their Taiwanese identity and a move away from a “Chinese” Islam.

Research Methodology

The research for this thesis was conducted over the two months of July and August, 2013. The two complementary research methodologies used during this time were participant observation and interviews. Participant observation is a method which anthropologists use in order to try and garner a deeper understanding of how those whom we conduct research with understand their lives. By participating in the lives of those we aim to understand, anthropologists aspire to gain insight into how individuals attach meaning to their lived experiences. Over the course of two months' field research, I conducted participatory observation at two mosques in Taipei and one in Zhongli. Participating in the mosques consisted of the activities around daily prayers; performing the ritual cleansing known as wudu, praying, and learning to read the Qur'an. Luckily, I was in Taipei for the month of Ramadan. This gave me the opportunity to participate in fasting as well as the festivities of the month (suhoor, iftar, Tarawih, and Eid al-Fitr). Other than attending prayer at the mosques, I participated in various Islamic activities such as funerals, the Halal expo, and the Islamic Cultural Exhibition. Further observations were done at various Halal restaurants. I have therefore strived to position myself within the research. This reflexive approach has allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the practical difficulties in being a Muslim in Taipei. This has facilitated a deeper understanding behind the interpretations of Islam Muslims adopt in their lives.

The second method used consisted of in-depth semi-structured interviews. Each interview consisted of various scripted questions about life histories and demographic information. Interviews were unstructured in that they would follow topics of interests as they emerge through the discussion. I made connection and set up interviews with Muslims I met at the three mosques and through social networks. Interviews lasted an average of one hour and allowed me to gather

information on the lives of Muslims in Taipei and of their views towards Islam and ethnicity in Taiwan. Respondents were able to choose the interview site, which was most often a mosque for convenience sake.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

1.1: Mainlander Studies

The existence of two major ethnic blocks in Taiwan is a fact obvious to everyone from the greenest tourist to my elderly landlady, who spends many cheerful hours slandering “those hillbilly Chinese” for cutting out the Taiwanese-language soap operas (Gates, 1981, 241).

When Hill Gates’ landlady slanders “hillbilly Chinese” she is referring to people who are considered part of the *Waishengren* (Mainlander) ethnic group in Taiwan. She is presented in opposition to this group as a *Benshengren* (Native Taiwanese). These two Mandarin words carry meaning of their own, beyond their usage as ethnic categories. The term *waishengren* means someone from outside of the province. Long before being adopted as the name for an ethnic group in Taiwan, it has been used in Mandarin as a way to refer to non-locals. The term is similar to the one used to refer to foreigners in China, *waiguoren* (those from outside the country). *Benshengren*, on the other hand means someone from the province. Also, Yang and Chang (2010) point out that those who came from China after 1945 were referring to themselves as *waisheng* immediately after arriving (111). This could be due to the fact that until 1949, when the Republic of China was the ruling government of all of China (including Taiwan after 1945), Taiwan was designated to be a province³.

The Mainlanders who arrived in Taiwan prior to and with the KMT are a minority on the island, making up 13% of the population. Despite this, they have been referred to as “privileged outsiders” due to the fact that they came with Chiang Kai-shek and established dominance over the Taiwanese (Yang & Chang, 2010: 110). Hill Gates (1981) was the first anthropologist to write about “Mainlander” and “Taiwanese” as representing two different ethnic groups. Her

³ Taiwan is still today a province of the Republic of China

study highlighted the economic inequalities between them. According to Yang and Chang (2010), further studies on ethnic relations in Taiwan did not catch on until the late 1980's because of the KMT's emphasis on national unity (111)⁴. Once the process of democratization started, there was a shift of identity as being of provincial origins to one of being of ethnic origins (Wang Fu-Chang in Yang & Chang, 2010). Yang & Chang write:

Under the new discursive regime, the connotation and imagination of the term “*waishengren*” changed from denoting outsiders of a province in an exiled/virtual ROC state that included mainland China to “*Waishengren*” as an ethnic group in a multicultural and democratic society on the island of Taiwan (2011: 112)

The late 1980's and early 1990's saw the emergence of studies focused on the ethnic differences between the four groups of Aborigines, Hoklo, Hakka, and Mainlanders (Yang & Chang, 2010). A conference in 1992 sponsored by the National Institute of Policy Research entitled “Provincial Origins, Ethnic Groups, and National Identity” resulted in the publication of an anthology edited by Chang Mau-kuei. Since this conference, research on Taiwanese ethnicity and ethnic relations continues to be popular, but have changed focus to the Mainlander “identity crises” due to the growing Taiwan oriented consciousness and Taiwanese nationalistic pride on the island (Yang & Chang, 2010).

According to Simon (2006), because of the transfer of power back to the Taiwanese, Mainlanders are afraid of becoming classified as an “ethnic minority or political scapegoat” (3). This period has been called an “identity crisis” for Mainlanders and has motivated many studies on the transformations of Mainlander identity. Some studies took the form of questionnaires for self-identification (Corcuff, 2002c). Corcuff (2002c) found that Mainlanders, especially younger

⁴ Here “national unity” would refer to all citizens of the Republic of China being Chinese. This would include the citizens of People's Republic of China as the KMT has maintained its claim as the rightful government of all the Chinese people.

generations, tended to identify with Taiwan instead of China. However, he points out that China is still regarded by *Waishengren* as the place of origin for their cultural traits. In fact, they believe that Taiwanese culture is also “Chinese” (190). In my own research, I have found that second and third generation Mainlanders still often speak about a cultural similarity between themselves and the Native Taiwanese. They call on these similarities to point out that everyone is culturally Chinese. By doing so, Mainlanders are claiming membership in a “Chinese” ethnic group, which in this view Native Taiwanese also belong. At the same time, this does not take away from their ability to identify as Taiwanese. Corcuff argues that this “Taiwanization” is more apparent in the younger generation who were born in on the island (2002c: 188).

In contrast to Corcuff, Li Kuang-chun (2002) found that Mainlanders would put on a “mask” when interacting with other groups in order to avoid discrimination. In order to do this he compares primary relationships (mirrors) to secondary relationships (masks). Li (2002) argues that in secondary relationship encounters, like speaking with a taxi driver, Mainlanders put on impression management in order to avoid being overtly *Waishengren*. He also points out that as more second generation Mainlanders speak Taiwanese they are usually more successful at this impression management (116).

In another study, Shen (2010) argues that a double identity is present which allows for the existence of both Chinese and Taiwanese identifications. I have found this to be pertinent to my own research. In subsequent chapters of this thesis I try to explain this dual identity as one which encompasses two distinct identifications. I take Chinese to be a global ethnic identity while Taiwanese is a national identity.


Recently, there has been an emergence of new studies which argue that Mainlanders have adopted a diasporic identity (Chang, 2005; Simon, 2006). This change is taking place as

Taiwanese nationalism replaces Chinese nationalism in Taiwanese society (Simon, 2006) and as Mainlanders perceive feelings of displacement from one country (China) to another (Taiwan) (Chang, 2005). Another field of Mainlander studies which has emerged and is related to diasporic studies is “subgroup” studies (Yang & Chang, 2010). It has emerged out of the recognition that there are subaltern groups within the Mainlander ethnicity and that not all Mainlanders fall under the heading of “privileged outsiders”. One of the first Mainlander sub-ethnic studies was carried out by Hu Tai-Li who looked at KMT veterans (1989). She was interested in pointing out that both the Native Taiwanese and Mainlander ethnic groups have various classes and that the approximately 600,000 veterans represented an impoverished group (1989: 255). Hu perceives those classified as *rongmin* (glorious citizens) by Chiang Kai-shek as constituting a separate ethnic group altogether. Typically, Hu argues, *rongmin* were seen to be those soldiers who held low positions in the army and not those of high status, to the point where some “better to-do veteran-mainlanders tend to conceal their status as *rongmin*” (1989: 256). Huang (2003) also points out that many soldiers did not enjoy the privileges of some in the KMT government. Nevertheless, many Taiwanese lost their jobs and status when the KMT arrived in Taiwan and the topic of Mainlander and Taiwanese ethnicity is still highly charged.

Social scientists have long struggled with the term *Waishengren*. Corcuff (2002c) writes that first generation Mainlanders did not usually associate their ethnic identity as such, but would more often refer to their province of birth in China. He also argues that second and third generation Mainlanders have strong ties to a Taiwanese identity (186). Recently, some scholars have taken this further by arguing that the ethnic divide between *Waishengren* and *Benshengren* is no longer important to young Taiwanese (this group includes both Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese) (Rigger, 1999, 2006; Le Pesant, 2011). Rigger (1999) sees the identity debate as

polarizing between two choices, unification or independence (158). She believes that this issue is not important to most Taiwanese, who are content with the status quo (188). Her assessment is supported by research conducted by the Election Survey Centre (figure 1).

Figure 1



Source: <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167#>

Le Pesant (2011) argues that the identities of young Taiwanese (born in the 1980's) are shaped around a common life experience as being born and growing up on the island. He believes the distinction between the four ethnic groups is not relevant to their social experiences. Instead, they are part of a Chinese cultural sphere and Taiwanese nation (152). Le Pesant (2011) rejects the label "Mainlander" in order to make his point that the Taiwanese youth primarily emphasize their Taiwanese identity over any division between the *Waishengren/Benshengren*. In

his recent work, Corcuff (2011b) has noticed a rejection in the Mainlander label when carrying out questionnaires. He found that some choose not to participate at all because the Mainlander label implies a cultural and ethnic divide between Chinese and Taiwanese peoples (117). Secondly, for those who did fill out the questionnaires there was a decline, since 1997, in those who identify as ethnically “Mainlander” (Corcuff, 2011b: 120).

Although I would agree with these arguments, I still maintain that there are tensions present between the two groups and that this constructed ethnic divide has relevance in Taiwanese society. I use the term “Mainlander” in order to make clear the people I am referring to and to try and argue that by rejecting this label they are actively trying to push for a Taiwanese identity. I have followed Yang and Chang’s (2010) call for more subgroup studies in order to better understand Mainlander identity. It is for this reason that I have capitalized the term “Mainlander”. I also refer to Muslim Mainlanders as Taiwanese Muslims throughout the thesis in order to highlight that they are both Mainlanders and Taiwanese. The category of Taiwanese Muslims also comprises of Native Taiwanese who have converted to Islam and Yunnanese Muslims. Many Muslims from Yunnan province in China migrated to Burma and Thailand after the communist take-over. They arrived in Taiwan after the Mainlanders and are therefore considered overseas Chinese.

The PhD dissertation of Barbara Pillsbury (1973) can be seen as an early Mainlander subgroup study. She argues that Muslims in Taiwan make up a distinct ethnic group as they maintained boundaries which designated them as Hui. In my research I have found that the conceptualization of a separate Hui identity is not present for second and third generation Taiwanese Muslims. The following section will provide an overview of the literature on Islam in Taiwan.

1.2: The Hui in Taiwan

To begin, I should highlight that very little research has been done on Islam in Taiwan. It is often overlooked in studies of Taiwanese religion. *Religion in Modern Taiwan* (2003), a volume of essays on Taiwan's religions does not mention Islam (Clart and Jones). However, there is a chapter on Christianity. *Contemporary religious movements in Taiwan* by Chou Kai-Ti (2007), discusses the influence of China on Taiwanese religion but also does not mention Islam, which disseminated to Taiwan from China. Other works on Taiwanese religion that do not mention Islam are *Religion and democracy in Taiwan* (Kuo, 2008) and *Religion at the end of the Japanese colonial period* (Jones, 2003). The essay written by Charles B. Jones (2003) provides an overview of Chinese religions from the Qing period which made their ways to Taiwan. Islam is not mentioned as one, although according to Gowing, during this period (17th Century) the first wave of Muslims to Taiwan from China occurred (1970: 22).

Gowing (1970) was one of the first scholars to write about the Muslims in Taiwan. Although his work is historically oriented, he also provides a general overview of Islam in Taiwan at that time. Gowing (1970) remarks that although the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence is usually the one implemented by Chinese Muslims, in Taiwan there is very little application of religious law (26). He also points out that the rules against alcohol and pork were often not maintained in Taiwan. Beyond describing these facets of being a minority in a non-Muslim country, Gowing does not go into great detail on how they identify themselves within Taiwanese society.

As previously mentioned, the most extensive study on Muslim Mainlanders is Barbara Pillsbury's PhD dissertation entitled *Cohesion and Cleavage in a Chinese Muslim Minority* (1973). The fieldwork for her study was conducted in Taipei from 1970 to 1972. She was

interested in determining whether or not the Chinese Muslims constituted a separate ethnic group in Taiwan. Using Barth's model, she argues that their identity as Hui does entail maintaining ethnic boundaries from non-Muslims (*Han*). When Sun Yat-sen outlined the "Five Peoples of China" he designated that the majority of Chinese people were part of the Han *minzu*⁵. Those Muslims who came to Taiwan maintained this sense of belonging to the *huizu* (the Hui *minzu*) after arriving and were very conscious of being different from the 98% Taiwanese Han (Pillsbury, 1973)⁶. Being Hui implied a dual identity, being part of a *minzu* (ethnicity according to Pillsbury) minority and also a Muslim. However, it is important to define what meanings were attached to being part of this ethno-religious people. As Pillsbury (1973) wrote:

Such diversities as those described above [native place] do not appear to have impaired the Chinese Hui image of themselves as a distinctive ethnic unit with unambiguous boundaries. On the contrary, they are constantly repeating what is beyond question the most common Muslim expression in China: "All Hui under heaven are one family"(73).

From the quote above it is clear the Hui had distinct boundaries which made someone Hui, and therefore a Muslim. The most important boundary was the idea of having inherited Hui blood. The Hui in Taipei believed in a blood pool which was passed down from generation to generation (Pillsbury, 1973: 74). They also took pride in the idea that this blood pool was not completely Chinese but mixed with the early Muslims who came to China from the west. Another boundary was the belief in one God. Lastly, Hui followed the Hui way of life. This

⁵ "Minzu" is a term which is not easily translated into English, although it is usually translated to either "ethnicity" or "nation". Being educated in Japan, Sun translated the Japanese *minzoku* into the Mandarin *minzu* (Crossly, 1990: 19). He advocated that China had five *minzu*; the Han, the Manchu, the Hui (Muslims), the Tibetan, and the Mongolians. Sun was doing this in order to bolster a national consciousness which could push the Manchu Qing rulers of China out of power. The Han (*Hanzu*) now make up the majority of people in both China and Taiwan. However, the term may have a different connotation in China since the PRC has split the population into 56 *minzu*. For this they used the Stalinist approach of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up. Therefore the concept of "*minzu*" in China is more closely associated with that of ethnicity.

⁶ Another distinction is that the People's Republic of China has designated that China has ten Islamic minorities. The Hui *minzu* is still the largest; however the connotation "Hui" has in China is different than what it would have had in 1949 when the majority of Chinese Muslims came to Taiwan.

meant practicing certain facets of Islam, the most important of which was deemed to be the pork taboo (Pillsbury, 1973: 76). At the time of her research, Pillsbury (1973) describes that the Hui were anxious about the future of their ethnic group. They did not want to become assimilated into the mainstream Han (265). The one factor which above all others meant someone had crossed over to being Han was the eating of Han food, pork. This was deemed to taint one's Hui blood. However, they differentiated between permanently tainting the blood (if someone chose to have pork in their diet) and temporarily tainting one's blood (eating pork due to circumstances). This was because when the Hui arrived in Taiwan they needed to adjust to their social context. They could not follow the pork taboo completely as many Muslim soldiers could not avoid eating pork while in the military.

That the Hui were concerned primarily with members leaving the ethnic boundary, by tainting their Hui blood through pork consumption, is quite telling and will be discussed later. In contrast this with Muslim Mainlanders who today no longer speak about themselves in terms of a homogenous Hui group, fearing some will become Han. Instead, they speak about themselves as Muslims, part of a global religion, and worry that many have left and will continue to leave the religion.

This pattern has also been observed by Lin Chang-kuan (2013), who argues that second and third generation Han-speaking Muslims in Taiwan feel more connected to Arab-Islam than to Chinese-Islam⁷. This has led from a shift in identity from being an ethnic minority (Hui) to a religious minority (29). Lin (2013) believes that this occurred after the lifting of martial law, during the process of democratization. The Muslim community in Taiwan, which was led by the pro-KMT Chinese Muslim Association, became more open to internal foreign influences (29, 31).

⁷ Lin (2013) refers to Taiwanese Muslims as Han-speaking Muslims in his work. The Mandarin 漢語穆斯林 (*Hanyu Muslim*) means Muslims who speak *Hanyu*, which is one way of referring to Mandarin.

Alongside this process, Lin (2013) has observed a shift towards more Taiwan oriented identities making for “Taiwanese Muslims” distinct from “Chinese Muslims” (42). Before moving on to discuss what I mean when I use the words “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” I wish to discuss the theoretical orientation that I use in order to describe individual and group identities.

1.3: Identity Theory

According to Charles Taylor (1994), the rise of democracy has changed identity from one being based on honour to one based on dignity (27). To Taylor, this is a change from the notion that humans are unequal to that of human equality. The ideal which arose surrounding equality is the notion of being true to oneself or having individual “authenticity” (Taylor, 1994: 28). In this paradigm, value is placed on living in accordance with one’s own identity. Taylor traces this way of thinking to Herder, who argued that we all have our own way of being human. This notion gives prominence in life to the task of looking inside ourselves to discover what we truly should be.

Taylor (1989) refers to this self-identity as “modern identity” (3). He believes that this modern self has an inner voice which is our morality. Understanding right and wrong is unique to each individual and is rooted in our identity. Taylor (1989) wrote:

My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame of horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose (27).

For Taylor, an individuals’ identity cannot escape their moral domain.

Chang Mau-kuei (2003) believes that the study of Taiwanese identity should follow a moral orientation by examining how people determine the “correct” directions they should take (24). As will be shown in this thesis, people often do relate their identities to their morals. As an

example, a Muslim Mainlander could describe his Taiwanese morals as different than Chinese ones while at the same time stating that Muslim morals differ from Taiwanese ones.

In his book *Sources of the Self*, Taylor (1989) provides the example that both religious and national group identities provide a moral frame for value judgements (27). This way of thinking is in line with modern understanding of Muslim people's. For example, Talal Asad (1986) argues that Islam should not be understood as an immutable set of beliefs but as a discursive tradition connected to our moral selves (7). Salman Sayyid (2003) has called Islam a "Master Signifier"; every Muslim can agree they are Muslim even though they may not agree on what Islam is. Bowen (2012) would agree with this view, stating that "Islam is best seen as a set of interpretive resources and practices" (3). He also points out that all Muslim have an idea of what correct Islamic practice is or should be (2012: 5).

Taylor (1989) goes on to say that the self can only be understood in relation to other selves (35). That is, we define ourselves always in relation to who we are speaking or interacting with. This is similar to what Charles Tilly (2005) describes as the root of group identity. He refers to interpersonal transactions as what create and transform social boundaries into identities (7). These transactions are mediated through historical, political, economic and personal factors. Just as no two lived experiences are the same, collective identities emerge because of similar perceptions of social interactions across individuals (Sperber, 1996: 81). It is the sharing of similar experiences which shape, for a time, collective identities. These notions will be applied to the current study on ethnic, national and religious identity among Taiwanese Muslims.

Also, identity is not based on culture or ancestral heritage but more often the interpretation of these through social experience. An ethnic group or a nation is made up of individuals who form a collective identity, which is the sharing of similar meanings in regards to

a group category. This includes both notions about the group and common ideas of who the other is, and what makes them distinct. Being part of an ethnic group or a nation implies the sharing of common meanings with others that form these groups. It also seems implied that since ethnicity and nationality are two different concepts, the meanings which define each must be different. What I have found in the research is that ethnic identity is often described through cultural traits and national identity is often described as being a member of a nation. In the case of this study the nation is Taiwan and individuals are nationality Taiwanese due to their being born and living there. These should not be taken as universals but more as a way for some Taiwanese living in the Republic of China to express feelings of belonging.

In *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Fredrick Barth (1969) argues that in order to understand ethnic groups we need to look at the boundaries which separate them. He is critiquing the abundance of research which looks solely at a group's history and cultural traits. Barth (1969) saw a flaw in analysing ethnic groups by looking at them as such ideal types. When ethnic groups are seen as culture-bearing units, then people are defined and categorized by showing traits which fit their group profile. Thus, attention is drawn to the analysis of cultures instead of ethnic organizations (Barth, 1969). For Barth, to truly understand how ethnic groups persist we must study the process by which boundaries are created and maintained. Barth puts forth two important assumptions which researchers must be aware of when looking at ethnic groups (1969: 9-10).

- 1) Boundaries are not maintained through the avoidance of contact between groups.

Therefore boundaries can still persist despite inter-ethnic flows.

- 2) Important social relations can persist across boundaries. Therefore boundaries are not dependant on a lack of contact.

In order for members of an ethnic group to recognize each other as such, they must have a shared understanding of the criteria for membership. They must also recognize when someone who is an outsider does not belong and why. By looking at the boundaries themselves, we can see what the criteria for recognition is (Barth, 1969). Therefore, for Barth, ethnicity is a self-ascription and not something inherent in the cultural legacy of a people. Here I would like to discuss three important points related to Barth's theory. The first is a criticism; that Barth places too much emphasis on the ability of people to self-identify, specifically in state societies where political power leads to "ascription by others" (Gates, 1981: 246). Scholars of ethnicity and identities in general have dealt with this by asserting that identity is based on social experience and interaction *mediated* by a cultural, political, and economic context (Brown, 2004: 13; Appiah, 1994: 154). The second important point which has been taken up by scholars is the notion of boundaries. Specifically, that ethnic identification is reliant on the recognition of difference, both by the group and by others in regards to that group. Lastly, the notion that "cultural stuff" and ancestry are not what determine ethnicity, but that the perception of these do. As an example, we have a definition of ethnicity provided by Mark Elliot; "the social organization and political assertion of difference perceived to inhere in culturally bounded, descent-based categories" (2006: 34).

In Is Taiwan Chinese?: The Impact of Culture, Power, and the Migration on Changing Identities, Melissa Brown (2004) provides evidence of changing ethnic categories based on new social experiences. In one section she writes about how the Plains aboriginals became Han. Although the Plains Aborigines shared many customs with the Han, including language and dress, they were deemed to be a separate ethnic group because they did not participate in foot binding. Although foot binding was an important distinction, it also led to other distinctions,

such as the role of women in society and of marriage patterns. In 1915, foot binding was banned by the Japanese administrators and the “social experience” of both groups changed (Brown, 2010: 464). Hoklo women now worked in the fields, and foot binding no longer had a role in marriage customs. This change in social experience influenced the ways in which each group interacted with the other and the Plains Aborigines became Han. Brown (2010) also points to the restructuring of taxation and land tenure that split the Taiwanese population into three distinct groups with three distinct social experiences: the Taiwanese (now incorporating Plains Aborigines), Japanese, and Aboriginal. This case provided by Brown (2004) on ethnic change is relevant to this thesis. As has been shown by Pillsbury (1973), the Muslim Mainlanders who first came to Taiwan were part of the Hui ethnic group. I will show that it is due to changing social experience, both in relation to religious and ethnic identity, they now self-ascribe as ethnically Chinese and nationally Taiwanese Muslims.

Nations, as well as ethnic groups, are socially constructed and therefore have real impacts of the lives of people. Benedict Anderson (2006) defines a nation as an imagined political community. It is “imagined” because even though an individual does not know even a small fraction of all members, that individual believes in a membership which feels the same national connections (Anderson, 2006: 6). Anderson also believes that nations are “limited” because they have borders and a finite number of people (2006: 7). Lastly, what makes these imagined entities a community is that regardless of inequality, they are always imagined with a horizontal comradeship; that members share something fundamental in common which unites them (7). For Anderson (2006) the nation is a relatively new phenomenon, emerging towards the end of the eighteenth century through modern successful revolutions which have defined themselves in national terms (2). He uses the example of the People’s Republic of China; however we can take

this farther back, to the founding of the Republic of China. In the late 1800's and early 1900's China was ruled by the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). The last dynasty in China was founded by the Manchu people who came from the northeast near the Korean peninsula. The Manchu were seen by the Chinese as foreign rulers. Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary leader fighting to return China to the Chinese people. He believed that in order for China to emerge out of the empire and into a modern nation-state the Chinese people needed to have national consciousness. He said,

The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to family and clan with the result that in China there have been family-ism and clan-ism but no real nationalism. Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a sheet of loose sand.... The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not extended to the nation (Sun, 1924: 2, 5)

In order to create this national unity, Sun Yat-sen pushed the idea of one Chinese majority for which he employed the term “Han”. The Han were the new majority of the “Five Peoples of China.”

Frank Dikötter (1992) traces the changing conceptualization of race in China, making the argument that China has had racial determinants long before any Western influence. He deconstructs the argument that racial prejudice is a “white” phenomenon. Near the end of the 19th century, China was rapidly changing; the Qing dynasty was on the decline and southern merchants who were trading with the West were becoming the new elite. The defeat of China during the Sino-Japanese War brought with it a sense that China needed to change. Many of the new merchant elite, called the *shenshang*, had been trained at schools in the West and saw a need for nationalism to emerge in China (Dikötter, 1992). Yan Fu (1853-1921) who grew up in a *shenshang* family from Fujian, and was educated in England, was an early proponent of rejecting the traditional Chinese view of race which was characterised by a civilized centre and a barbarian periphery. Instead he argued for race being based on lineage, claiming that there were

four main races on earth: the yellow, the white, the brown, and the black (Dikötter, 1992: 67). Around the same time another son of the merchant elite, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), was pushing the idea of race as nation. Race as nation was an extension of race as lineage, as it encompassed both a shared ancestry as well as territory (Dikötter, 1992, p. 97). Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary leader trying to overthrow the Qing Empire and was employing race as nation in order to make the transition to nation-state. In the end, Sun Yat-sen was successful in uniting the Chinese people under the banner of the *Hanzu*. Currently 91% of the population of mainland China and 98% of Taiwan are Han. Importantly, as Dikötter (1992) points out, according to Sun, the Han were a biological unit (125). The implication being that all the people now categorized as Han are believed to have a biological basis which makes them part of the same hereditary and cultural category, the same ethnic and national group. This is a theme which has been adopted in both Western and Chinese literature. As Tamara Chin (2012) shows in her critical look at the Han ethnic category, the ethnic re-categorization of the Chinese people under the heading of *Hanzu* has been so successful that the history of Chinese civilization has been rewritten and re-imagined as the history of Han civilization. This includes the early Chinese settlers to Taiwan from Fujian and Guangdong (Hoklo and Hakka) who are thought to have always been Han. It is more probable that the Nationalist government, upon arriving in Taiwan, needed to emphasize that the Hoklo and Hakka were Han in order to bolster their claim as the rightful government of the Chinese people, and one that would include Taiwan.

1.4: Chinese and Taiwanese

Two collective identities which are important for this study are Chinese and Taiwanese. The title of Melissa Brown's (2004) work, *Is Chinese Taiwanese?*, implies two questions; is Taiwan politically Chinese and do the Taiwanese identify as Chinese? She deals with the question of sovereignty quickly by asserting that "Taiwan is clearly no more a part of the PRC at the turn of the twenty-first century then, say, South Korea" (Brown, 2004: 1). For her discussion on identity Brown used the term "Han" to refer to an ethnic Chinese identity and "Chinese" as a national identity of the PRC (2004: 1). I believe this to be problematic in relation to the findings of this research. There seems to be a number of groups that would identify as ethnically Chinese but not as ethnically Han, both in Taiwan and in China, as well as Canada and other countries. For example, some Cantonese speakers in China might refer to themselves as *Tangren* (a way of referring to southern Cantonese speaking Chinese, getting its name from the Tang dynasty), even though they may be recognized by the government as Han (Elliot, 2012). It is because a large portion of migrants out of China in the early 20th century were Cantonese that Chinatowns across the world are called *tangren jie* (Tang People Street).

It is important to first think about what we mean by "Chinese". As a starting point and as Melissa Brown has shown, to be Chinese can simply mean to be a citizen of China (The PRC). In Mandarin, China is *Zhongguo*, *zhong* meaning middle and *guo* meaning country or land. A person from China is a *Zhongguo ren* (Chinese person). However, in this research I have found that even those who are not citizens of the PRC will self-identify as ethnically *Zhongguo ren*. Also, Hill (1998) writes of the Yunnanese in Thailand saying that they identify as ethnically Chinese using the Mandarin term *Zhongguo ren* (27).

During the nationalist revolution, the idea of the *zhonghua minzu* was used to denote a Chinese group incorporating the *Han* and the other four ethnic minorities of the time. *Hua*, or *Huaxia* is an older way of referring to people from the inner lands of China proper, and was thus employed in the previous term (Tu, 1999). If someone was to employ the use of the term *Hua ren* they would be referring to being Chinese in the sense of not only being a citizen of China but part of a larger collective identity. For example, the concept of overseas Chinese (Chinese born or living outside China) is *Huaqiao* in Mandarin (Damm, 2011; Wang 1998). Damm (2011) points out that the DPP policy of perceiving the Taiwanese as “Chinese” in the sense of *Hua ren* instead of *Zhongguo ren* was employed in order to create a Taiwanese political identity (227). It emphasises the distinction between ethnic and national identity.

I am making the claim that there is such an imagined entity as a Chinese collective and that it resembles an ethnic one. According to Mark Elliot (2012) those who identify as such believe in a “cultural core” which is seen to originate from the geographic core of the *neidi* (inner lands) (173). Tu Wei-Ming (1999) points out that the expressions *Hua* or *Huaxia*, meaning Chinese, refers to a culture and civilized group which traces its history to a perceived China proper (3). As I have already argued, ethnic identities are employed to denote difference between groups. It is my position that a sense of a Chinese ethnicity is present for Muslim Mainlanders in Taipei and can be seen in the way some speak of a cultural sameness between the *Waishengren* and *Benshengren*. It is for these reasons which I take “Chinese” to refer to an ethnic identity as well as a national one, just as Taiwanese can also be both. For some Native Taiwanese, maintaining that Taiwanese is an ethnic category has been important in the desire to differentiate themselves. They may reject the label *Huaren* altogether to emphasise that they are not Chinese.

For the Mainlanders, Taiwanese as a national identity implies that they are fundamentally Taiwanese.

It is important to understand what being Taiwanese entails, and how it is a distinct identity from being a citizen of the Republic of China. The ROC is a sovereign state with borders that include the islands of Taiwan, Matsu, Kinmen, Penghu, Wuqiu, Dongsha and Nansha. However, the Republic of China still officially endorses that the Chinese provinces are part of its domain. Le Pesant (2011) refers to “being Taiwanese” as “having a sense of belonging to an imagined, territorialized, sovereign, political community of shared interests limited to Taiwan – that is, a *Taiwanese nation*” (151). The following chapter will introduce the history of Taiwan and of Islam in Taiwan in order to better contextualize the identities presented throughout the thesis.

Chapter 2: Historical Background

A historical overview of Taiwan and of Islamic practice on the island, which originally came from China, is important in order to understand the context of cotemporary Taiwan. It is also important to show that changing political, economic and social factors have influenced the social experiences of the Taiwanese. Due to this, Taiwanese identities have changed over time. In the first part of this section I will examine the roots of the *Waishengren* and *Benshengren* ethnic divide. I ask what led to this divide becoming a lived reality and what factors have since shaped it. Once this is done, I will turn to examine the history of Islam in China and then to Taiwan.

2.1: The People of Taiwan

In this section I am presenting a history of Taiwan with the intention of facilitating a discussion on the emergence and persistence of the Mainlander/ Native Taiwanese ethnic divide. Approximately 6000 years ago, Austronesian aboriginals began inhabiting Taiwan. In fact, there is a theory which places Taiwan as the original home of the Austronesian peoples (Bellwood, 2004). The aboriginals, who can be divided into various groups but who collectively refer to themselves as *Yuanzhumin* (original people) make up approximately 2% of the population of Taiwan (Simon, 2012: 20). In 1623, the Dutch established bases in Taiwan in order to trade between China and Japan. It was during this time that Chinese settlers from Fujian province settled on the island. These Hoklo people make up 73% of the current population of Taiwan. They speak Hokkien, commonly known as Taiwanese. In 1661, after a naval invasion led by Cheng Ch'eng-kung, Taiwan became ruled by the mainland of China for the first time (Wills, 2007: 95). After China transitioned from Ming dynasty to Qing dynasty, Taiwan was once again invaded by the Qing naval commander Shih Lang in 1683. Taiwan became a prefecture of Fujian

province in order to prevent other global powers from capturing the island (Wills, 2007: 95). In the 17th and 18th centuries, more Chinese from Guangdong province moved to Taiwan. These Chinese migrants identify as the Hakka ethnicity and make up around 13% of the current population. Taiwan remained in Qing hands until it was ceded to Japan after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. At the conclusion of the war, a treaty was signed at the port of Shimonoseki between the Manchu Qing and the Japanese on April 17th, 1895 (Corcuff, 2002a: xii). Taiwan, then called Formosa, remained a colony of the Japanese Empire for 50 years. The Japanese administrators distinguished between Hoklo and Hakka as two distinct “races” with mutually unintelligible “dialects” and varying customs (Brown, 2004: 9).

Japan was forced to relinquish Formosa as a colony after WWII. This was made official at the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty⁸. It is written in the treaty that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” (Article 2, B). It was not specified to which country Japan was ceding Formosa. It was the Treaty of Taipei which designated that Taiwan would become a part of the Republic of China (ROC), which was founded on the mainland of China in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen⁹. Signed between the Republic of China and Japan in 1952, this second treaty designated that Taiwan was part of the ROC, and the people of Taiwan were ROC citizens (Article 10). Nevertheless, the Republic of China had already taken effective control of Taiwan in 1945 when Chiang Kai-shek sent Chen Yi to Taiwan in order to head the “take-over” (Chang, 2003: 42).

⁸ The San Francisco Peace Treaty (Treaty of Peace with Japan) can be found at <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm>

⁹ The Treaty of Taipei (Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan) can be found at <http://taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm>

The idea of a “glorious return” to the ancestor’s country that may have originally been fostered by the Hoklo and Hakka was quickly dispelled because of the harsh treatment of the Taiwanese under the Kuomintang (KMT) government (Brown, 2004: 9). Due to the early mismanagement and corruption present in the new KMT government, Taiwan’s economy quickly deteriorated (Edmondson, 2002). Also, some 36,000 Taiwanese were forced out of their public sector jobs (Lai, Meyers & Wou, 1991: 170). These conditions led some Taiwanese to describe the conditions under the Japanese as being better than those under the KMT (Edmondson, 2002: 27). Melissa Brown (2010) describes a “colonial nostalgia” witnessed when some Taiwanese men dressed in Japanese imperial army hats after the lifting of martial law (468). February 28th, 1947 offers a focal point for a collective memory of the hardships endured under the KMT. An incident between police officers and a woman selling smuggled cigarettes sparked a rising up of the Taiwanese people, demanding an end to corruption and abuses (Chang, 2003: 43). While Chen Yi was seen to be negotiating with the protestors, Chiang Kai-shek sent a convoy of soldiers to the island. The army used force and gunfire to put down the uprising; student and professional activists were targeted for execution. An official state of “civil war” lasted until martial law was lifted in 1987. The period of martial law is referred to as the “white terror” due to a fear instilled in the Taiwanese during this time. The sentiments of the Taiwanese people in the face of these hardships are a probable explanation for the emergence of an ethnic division along the lines of Native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Robert Edmondson (2002) writes, “The betrayal and violence of the Chinese Nationalist government made the boundaries of a distinct historical subject ‘the Taiwanese people’ clear and compelling” (25). It has also led some scholars to refer to the period before democratization in Taiwan as colonial (Corcuff, 2002c: 165;

Wu, 2002: 196; Simon, 2006: 87). Although not all Mainlanders were “colonizers”, Native Taiwanese began to associate the term *waishengren* with the regime from mainland China¹⁰.

In 1949 the KMT retreated to Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek established governance of the ROC from Taipei. They had just lost the civil war to the communists but maintained the claim of being the rightful government of China¹¹. Until the political reforms of the late 1980’s, Mainlanders maintained what Corcuff (2002c) calls a “guest mentality” (166). They were taught by the KMT government that Taiwan was only a temporary exile. They were also taught that Taiwan was culturally and ethnically Chinese. The idea that the Taiwanese would have “re-engineered” a culture for themselves would not have been easily accepted (Corcuff, 2011b: 126). Mainlanders could not speak either Hokkien or Hakka and would have been reluctant to learn. This created another barrier between the groups. Furthermore, Mainlanders were distrustful of the Japanese legacy in Taiwan, having not long ago fought a war against them.

After the lifting of martial law in 1987 the KMT remained in power for the following thirteen years. However, Taiwan did undergo certain processes which have been called “Taiwanization” and “indigenisation”. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui, of Taiwanese origin, replaced Chiang Ching-kuo as the leader of the KMT and president of Taiwan. In 1996, he became the first democratically elected president of the ROC. Lee made changes in Taiwan which reflect an increase in Taiwanese nationalism and at the same time an increase in rejecting things seen as Chinese. One such important change was the demise of Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine of the “Three

¹⁰ Wu Nai-teh (2005) argues that approximately 40 percent of white terror victims were Mainlanders, while they accounted for only 10-15 percent of the population.

¹¹ Both the Republic of (ROC) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) use the Mandarin words *Zhonghua* people in their names. These two words, *zhong* (middle) and *hua* (flower) are important when thinking about Chinese heritage and identity. *Hua* has historically been used as the name for a Chinese race. On the other hand, *zhong* designates a geographic area, China. In the official name of Taiwan, we see that “Republic of China” implies a claim to the governance of the geographic area sometimes referred to as the middle lands, or more romantically, the middle kingdom, and the Chinese people who inhabit these lands. This issue is recognized by some in Taiwan who are calling for their government to end claims of governance over China and declare for an independent nation-state - Taiwan or the Republic of Taiwan.

Principles of the People” (Nationalism, Democracy, and the People’s welfare) (Corcuff, 2002b: 77). This doctrine was cut out of the Examination Yuan in 1994. Other such changes were the promotion of Taiwan centered school books and the changing of certain banknote symbols. Stéphane Corcuff (2002b) points to another important change; in 1999, Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices ruled that organizations registering at the Ministry of the Interior no longer had to include the words “The Republic of China” in their name (74). These changes contributed to the Mainlander identity crisis. As Yang and Chang (2010) state:

On the one hand, the native Taiwanese majority of Hoklo descent saw the changes under indigenisation as long-awaited poetic justice after decades of KMT/Mainlander domination. On the other hand, Mainlanders saw the cherished memories of their family and community become politically incorrect and felt their dignity being trampled upon by the current discourse of indigenisation and Taiwan nationalism (114)

As can be seen from the quote, a rejection of things connected to the mainland China led to an identity crisis, as Mainlanders tried to navigate their place in Taiwanese society. Some first and second generation Mainlanders felt their Chinese identity threatened by the popular movement towards Taiwanization. Others, adopted a Taiwanese national identity but lacked the historical experience of living through the Japanese colonial period. They also lacked Taiwanese language proficiency.

In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was formed during the democracy movement in 1986, won their first national election. Chen Shui-bian, another Native Taiwanese, became president. Although the DPP, since 1991, had a mandate to pursue formal independence, they adopted the more moderate stance of status quo independence during the election campaign and after their victory (Schubert and Braig, 2011: 73). During the DPP’s eight years in power, the process of Taiwanization continued to progress. In school, the history of Taiwan was prioritized over Chinese or world history. In elementary schools, the study of

“native languages”, meaning Hokkien, Hakka, or various aboriginal languages, was made mandatory. Also the 228-Incident was employed as a reminder that Taiwan needed to maintain a firm stance when it came to military or unification threats from China (Schubert & Braig, 2011: 78). The DPP under Chen also tried to create a distinct Taiwanese identity. They followed a policy of perceiving the Taiwanese as “Chinese” in the sense of *Hua ren* and not *Zhongguo ren* (people from China) (Damm, 2011: 227).

In 2005, Ma Ying-jeou was elected to head the KMT. The party that had previously been chaired by two Native Taiwanese now had another Mainlander leading them. Ma was elected president of the Republic of China in May 2008. Since this time, the percentage of cabinet members of Mainlander origin has increased. Ma also reintroduced the Three Principles of the People into the examination Yuan in order to re-sinicize the curricula.

On June 29th 2010, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. The aim of this trade agreement is to increase the flow of capital between the two nations. Outlined in the pact is the gradual removal of trade and investment barriers. To many in Taiwan, this trade pact is part of a trend in which the Chinese government has a growing influence in Taiwan. On March 18th 2014, a protest began which was in large part organized and initiated by Taiwanese university students. The protestors broke into and occupied the office of the branch of government which oversees constitutional amendments, called the Legislative Yuan, and locally referred to as *guohui* (parliament). This wave of protests is known as the Sunflower Movement.

The second point of contention, according to Sunflower Movement, is that the pact was prematurely signed without proper consideration and oversight of the possible ramifications. Protesters claimed that the pact was undemocratic and that Taiwanese democracy was at stake.

The response that the signing of this pact has produced in Taiwan runs much deeper than the issue of the pact itself. Had this been a trade agreement between Canada and Taiwan, it is unlikely that hundreds of thousands would have been protesting in the streets on March 30th. Underlining the issues of the trade agreement itself and the undemocratic way it was rushed through the legislature, is the desire many in Taiwan have of asserting themselves as Taiwanese and not Chinese. Wu Rwei-ren, a political scientist at Academia Sinica, said:

The Sunflower movement's key issues focused on social justice, environmental issues and other themes. They also critically examined and reflected on Taiwan's democracy declining... Taiwanese identity was clearly manifested in strong ways, which came to the forefront and brought people together, as it arose from the grassroots levels and reached up through society (Tang & Pan, 2014: 1).

Protesters expressed their identities by stating "We are Taiwanese, we don't want to become Chinese" (Tang & Pan, 2014: 1).

The issue of Taiwanese identity has been a force in politics, social studies, and more importantly, the lives of the citizenry of the Republic of China since the KMT landed in Taiwan and established its governance over the island by military force. With the KMT regaining power and the subsequent ties between China and Taiwan becoming closer, the question of Taiwanese identity has renewed importance. In this thesis I want to move beyond categories of Native Taiwanese and Mainlander. I wish to take a more nuanced approach in order to examine identity and political opinion. I do not believe it productive or realistic to say that Mainlanders are pro-Chinese and Native Taiwanese are pro-Taiwanese. Instead, many Mainlanders are "pro-Taiwanese" in the sense that they see themselves as an integral part of an independent nation. In order to further contextualize the Muslim Mainlander population in Taiwan the following section will discuss the history of Islam in China.

2.2: Islam in China

Of all Muslim minorities throughout the world, the Muslims of China clearly rank foremost among those with the longest and one of the most unusual histories. The history of Islam in China begins with the coming together of the two great traditions, the Islamic and the Chinese, when both were flourishing (Pillsbury, 1981, 10).

It is likely that Muslims began trading with and settling within the periphery areas of China since the beginnings of Islam (Chang, 1981). One route which was used to reach China was the sea route, arriving in Canton and other southeastern ports from the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf. The second was the land route, from Central Asia along the Silk Road, reaching Xi'an and Beijing. Over time these Muslims became an "indigenous population" to China (Pillsbury, 1981: 10)¹². This is the common narrative told about the Hui people. The Hui are believed to be the descendants of Muslim merchants, soldiers and officials who migrated to China from the eighth to fourteenth centuries and intermarried with Chinese Han women (Gladney, 1998; Zang, 2007).

The narrative of being Chinese Muslims instead of Muslims in China is in contrast to that of other Muslim groups in China who did not assimilate into a Chinese ethnicity. For example, the Turkic Uyghur, who settled in the northwestern Xinjiang province of China, are often positioned as rebellious in their desire to separate from China, even to the extent of being a potential terrorist threat (Arabinda & Wang, 2010). The Hui are often positioned as intermediaries between the Uyghur and Han. This is due to them being thought of as loyal to one group through religion and to the other because of ethnic and cultural similarities.

¹² Pillsbury's use of the term "indigenous" does not carry its present meaning of a group with specific rights due to their historical ties to a territory. According to the United Nations Indigenous peoples are typically marginalized and lack power in relation to a dominant political group. At other times Pillsbury uses the term "sinification" as the process of the Chinese Muslims, and their Islamic practices, becoming more *Chinese* (1973: 10).

It was during the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) that large Muslim migration into China occurred. The northern Mongol rulers preferred not to give governing control into Chinese hands and so brought in foreigners to work as government officials (Chang, 1987: 135). During this time, the foreigners (including Muslims) were regarded as secondary to the Mongols. Below them were the Chinese, split into two groups. The *Han-jen* were northern Chinese and the *Nan-jen* were southern Chinese and the “least desirable and least trustworthy group” (Rossabi, 1988: 71). Although Muslims had been reaching Yunnan via the Silk Road for many years, the Yuan dynasty established Yunnan as a concentration area for Muslims in China (Atwill, 2005: 34).

After the Yuan period, China became ruled once again by the Chinese. According to Pillsbury (1973), it was after the Yuan dynasty that Islam in China was influenced by Chinese practices (13). The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) implemented policies which prohibited foreign dress, names and languages (Chan, 1969: 209). This led to lessening of foreign influences on Muslims and on closer relations with the Chinese. They underwent many changes which no longer set them as far apart from the non-Muslim Chinese. One change was adopting Chinese surnames. Most common among these was, and still is Ma. A Taiwanese Muslim, with the surname Ma, told me that this was because it was a close alternative to Muhammad. Muslims also adopted Chinese style of dress. Pillsbury (1973) describes the women’s veiling as changing from daily wear to clothes only worn during religious ceremony (14). Chinese Muslims also adopted eating with chopsticks instead of with the right bare hand, as well as new ways of preparing food. This did not, however, lead to an abandonment of the pork or alcohol taboos. Lastly, for the Hui, local Chinese languages replaced Arabic and Persian as their native language (Pillsbury, 1973: 15). These similarities between the Hui and Han have led some scholars to say that the Hui are simply Han who follow Islam, but are not distinct ethnically (Lipman, 2007).

Following the Ming dynasty was the Qing (1644-1912). The period in which the Manchu Qing dynasty ruled China is referred to as a “dark age” for Muslims (Chang, 1987: 67). This is due to the harsh policies towards Muslims which were adopted during the Qing dynasty. It is possible that ten million Muslims died over the course of ten uprisings in the 18th and 19th centuries (Chang, 1981: 33). One example is the Muslim rebellion in Yunnan in the late 19th century. In 1856, the Qing administrator Shuxing’a took over temporary governing duties of Yunnan. From the capital of Kunming he implemented harsh anti-Muslim policies. At the time, Chinese Muslims made up 10% of Yunnan’s multiethnic population (Atwill, 2005: 3). This eventually led to the provincial judge Qingsheng, a member of an anti-Muslim faction, ordering the “authorized slaying [of Muslims] without being held accountable” (Atwill, 2005: 3). A massacre ensued which lasted three days and nights. Upon his return from Guizhou, the Governor General Hengchun tried to reverse the damage that had been done. He was unsuccessful in avoiding a large scale rebellion. Fourteen months after the massacre, Hengchun committed suicide inside the walls of Kunming, which was surrounded by Muslim armies and was one of the last cities in Yunnan which remained under Qing control (Atwill, 2005: 7). The Yunnanese Muslim rebellion had at this point taken over much of Yunnan, including the city of Dali. For seventeen years, the Yunnanese Muslims established and maintained their own state, a Muslim Sultanate which lasted until 1873 when the Qing armies defeated the Muslims. After a final defeat at Tawnio, many remnants of the Sultanate retreated to the Shan state in British Burma (Hill, 1998: 15). These Yunnanese Muslims were called the *Panthay* by the local Wa people. They established themselves in Panglong on the east bank of the Salween River (Forbes, 1988: 38).

This harsh treatment of Muslims in during the Qing dynasty is a probable explanation for alliances which were created between Muslim and Nationalist leaders during the Republican era. The early twentieth century became a time of increasing Islamic consciousness for Muslims in China. Pillsbury (1973) refers to this as a “sunnification” (20). The term refers to the *Sunna*, which means living one’s life in accord with the way the Prophet Muhammad lived his. In the context of twentieth century China, it refers to trying to return to an orthodox Islam. In the Republic of China, Muslims were now able to pursue an Islamic renaissance. Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine pushed for harmony between the Hui, Han, Manchu, Mongols and Tibetans. Muslims began making pilgrimages to Mecca and visiting dignitaries came to China. For the first time in China, there emerged nation-wide Muslim organizations (Pillsbury, 1973: 22). In 1937, the Chinese Muslim National Salvation Federation was created in alliance between the Nationalist government and Muslim leaders, in particular General Bai Chongxi¹³, to fight the Japanese. It was founded in Nanjing and moved with the retreating KMT to Taiwan after the Communist take-over¹⁴. After moving to Taiwan the association maintained close relations with the KMT government (Lin, 2013: 29).

Due to the improved freedom and status of Islam in China during the Republican era, Muslims in Taiwan have typically thought positively of the KMT government (Gowing, 1970). Throughout my research, I found that Taiwanese Muslims believe they have had more religious freedom than their mainland counterparts. They speak with sadness that Muslims in China have

¹³ General Bai Chongxi, 白崇禧, is the most famous Muslim in Taiwan’s history. He was born in Gansu province of China in 1893. During the Sino-Japanese war, Chiang Kai-shek relied on him to unite the Muslim warlords of the northwest with the KMT cause. He was the founder and leader of the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation until his death in 1966.

¹⁴ The name was changed to the Chinese Muslim Association. The CMA is still the prominent Muslim organization in Taiwan.

had their religion suppressed by the Communist government. About this situation Pillsbury (1973) wrote:

The re-constructed community of Chinese Muslims on present-day Taiwan is clearly more orthodox than the communities from which its members came. This is due not only to the orthopraxy leadership of the Al-Azhar graduates but also to the fact that the community has been regarded as an important foreign policy of support from the Middle East and Muslim countries (26).

2.3: Islam in Taiwan

Permanent Muslim settlers first reached Taiwan from Fujian Province. This first wave of Muslim migration arrived on the island in 1661 after the fall of the Ming dynasty. It is not known how many Chinese Muslims came; however, the few families that did settled in the coastal towns of Lukang, Keelung, Sual, Tamsui, and Changhua. Any mosque that was built during this time has since been replaced by temples as these Muslims lost knowledge of their Islamic practices. Gowing (1970) believes that it was during the Japanese colonial period when “foreign” religions were suppressed that the Muslims were assimilated (1). Pillsbury (1973) adds that when the Japanese came, they would not have differentiated between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese (236). However, some artifacts and practices have been maintained in originally Muslim families which prove their religious past. Examples are not providing pork as food for the family shrine and not eating pork on Fridays. Some families have also kept the Qur’an as a family keepsake and embalm their dead in white cloth (Lin, 2013: 23).

The second wave of Muslim migration to Taiwan occurred in 1949. An estimated 20,000 Chinese Muslims came from all regions of China and spoke various languages. Some, from Xinjiang, were considered Uyghur; others were considered Hui or even Han (Pillsbury, 1974: 4). Most of the Muslims who went to Taiwan were soldiers and so did not have a choice but to leave

their families behind in China, originally believing their stay in Taiwan was temporary. Some of these men never remarried nor had children. An expatriate from Mauritius who has been living in Taipei for over 30 years spoke of a lingering sadness that never quite left these men. Others, like Su, remarried, making the mental transition from hoping to someday reunite with their families to accepting uncertainty about whether or not they would ever see them again¹⁵. The following narrative is about Su's life in Taiwan.

Su was a Muslim soldier in the KMT army. The civil war was progressing in favour of the Communists, and so with the army Su was forced to retreat further and further towards the coast. As he was from Henan Province, he was getting farther away from his home where his wife and mother lived. At some point in 1948, he received a message from his wife telling him that she was pregnant. He hoped at this point to return to his hometown. This was not possible however, as the roads were blocked due to the war. In 1949, Su left China for Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and his government. In the end, Su married again and had children on the island that he originally thought would not be his home for long. In the years that followed, he never forgot about his family on the mainland and tried, through a friend in the United States, to find information about them. These initial attempts were unsuccessful and it was not until the early 1990's that Su was able to return to the mainland to find his family. He met his previous wife and his son, who at this point had children of his own. Su has since brought his Taiwanese wife and children to visit Henan. Also, when he was sick in the hospital his son travelled to Taipei to see him.

Some of the Hui Muslims included prominent members of the military and government. Foremost among these was General Bai Chongxi of the KMT military. Bai also provided help to

¹⁵ Throughout this thesis I use pseudonyms when discussing interview respondents

his Hui brothers and sisters in establishing community ties in the early days after arriving in Taiwan. The first place for Muslims to worship communally was set up shortly after the first arrivals in the spring of 1949. A Japanese-style home in Taipei was used for worship, networking, and as a place for new arrivals to stay until they found a home for themselves (Pillsbury, 1974: 81). A second Japanese-style home was set up as an alternative place of worship the following year. These two locations, in Da'an and Guting, attracted many Muslims to find homes nearby. The problem was that many Muslims felt that the use of two Japanese-style homes was a sad change from their situation in China. It was a loss of face to have to entertain visiting dignitaries in these small prayer halls (Pillsbury, 1974: 83). Because of this, Bai Chongxi and George Yeh, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, negotiated the construction of a mosque, built to resemble Arabic-Persian Islamic architecture.

In 1960, the Taipei Grand Mosque was built and is referred to by local Muslims as the *da masjid* (from the Mandarin 'big' and Arabic 'mosque'). The mosque was built with both local and foreign monetary help. This included funding from the Shah of Iran and the King of Jordan. The Nationalist government also gave a loan of \$100,000 dollars (Gowing, 1970: 23). As it turns out, the loan was never paid back but erased due to President Chiang Ching-kuo acknowledging the help provided by Taiwan's Muslims in securing lower oil prices from Saudi Arabia during the 1973 oil crisis. In the face of rising oil prices, the Nationalist government sent a delegation of eleven officials, nine of which were Muslim, to Saudi Arabia to discuss oil prices. They were successful in saving 50 cents per barrel for Taiwan.

In the previous section I have alluded to a strategic position of Muslims in Taiwan's foreign policy. It was of early importance for the KMT government to showcase the freedom their Muslim population had in order to garner support from Islamic nations (Pillsbury, 1973: 83).

Saudi Arabia is one such country with which the Muslims in Taiwan and the Taiwanese government have had close relations. In fact, Saudi Arabia did not end official diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 1990. In 1971, the year the United Nations gave the China seat to the People's Republic of China; King Faisal of Saudi Arabia came to Taiwan and visited the Taipei Grand Mosque. Saudi Arabia also put forth the "One China, One Taiwan" proposal. This meant giving the PRC the China representation at the United Nations, but also having the ROC represent "Taiwan"¹⁶. It is due to these close relations that Saudi Arabia is still the favoured destination for Taiwanese Muslims to study Islam.

Since its founding, the Taipei Grand Mosque has been the location for the headquarters of the Chinese Muslim Association, which moved from Nanjing to Taipei after WWII. The CMA still runs its organization from an office along the northern corridor of the mosque. It has been, and continues to be, active in organizing special events, putting on summer camps, and publishing a bimonthly journal. Another mosque in Taipei is the Taipei Culture Mosque, known as *xiao masjid* (small mosque). This mosque was originally located in the second Japanese-style home but was moved to a nearby building. In 1982, after several deteriorations, the building was rebuilt as a five story mosque. Aside from the two mosques in Taipei, there are five other mosques in Taiwan. Other major cities which early on had a Muslim population large enough to accommodate a mosque are Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung

The Longkang mosque in Zhongli was built in order to accommodate for the religious needs of the third wave of Islamic migration to Taiwan. This third wave is actually two distinct periods of Yunnanese Muslim migration. After the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists, many KMT veterans fighting in Yunnan retreated over land into either Burma or

¹⁶ This was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek, who maintained that the Republic of China is the rightful government of China.

Thailand (Chang, 2001: 1088). As a consequence of being heavily armed from the civil war, these army units quickly formed into guerrilla forces (*youjidui*) and re-established contact with the KMT in Taiwan. At the urging of the ROC and US governments, these forces fought the communists in Yunnan in 1950 and 1952. In 1951, the guerrillas were named “The Yunnan Anti-Communist Salvation Army” (Chang, 2001: 1088). Also, fighting between the Yunnanese and Burmese military took place. The newly independent government of Burma was uncomfortable with the KMT presence in their country due to a possible invasion from China (Chang, 2001: 1089). Furthermore, the KMT Guerillas operated largely outside the control of the Burmese government due to being heavily armed and survivors of a civil war. Some guerrilla forces used their military might to establish opium trade between Burma and northern Thailand. Pressure from the Burmese government, and eventually the UN, forced the KMT to evacuate their veterans to Taiwan from November 1953 to June 1954 (Chang, 2001: 1090). The first evacuation, from November 1953 to June 1954, was largely unsuccessful as many veterans moved into northern Thailand or remained in Burma (Hill, 1998: 19). A second evacuation of Yunnanese to Taiwan occurred in 1961, after the Burmese allied with the PRC to fight against the remaining guerillas. Although many Yunnanese chose once again to stay in Burma or move to Thailand, this second evacuation ended the ties between the KMT in Taiwan and the civil war refugees (Chang, 2001: 1090).

These Yunnanese Muslims, who in the 1950’s came to Taiwan, largely settled just outside of Taipei in the Longkang area of Zhongli. The Longkang Mosque was built in 1967 to serve their religious needs. As opposed to the mosques in Taipei, the Longkang Mosque is in the middle of a residential area of Yunnanese Muslims. According to Pillsbury (1974), the Muslim Mainlanders created no central residential area when arriving in Taiwan (80). She also predicted

that this could be a factor for the possible assimilation of the Hui into the Han. She pointed out that Hui and Han communities were segregated on the mainland and thus maintained stricter ethnic boundaries (Pillsbury, 1974: 28). Lin Chang-kuan (2013) believes this to be a reason why there has been no local sense of community for Chinese Muslims in Taipei. Instead, he sees the Muslim community as having been dispersed (26). The Yunnanese Muslims arriving in Taiwan did form concentrated areas to live. Centering the Longkang mosque, a true sense of a Muslim diasporic community emerged in the area (Lin, 2013: 26).

Later, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, many more Yunnanese from Thailand and Burma immigrated to Taiwan. These Yunnanese migrants are considered "overseas Chinese" (*Huaqiao*), not Mainlanders. They either found residence in Zhongli or in the Zhonghe district of Taipei, where there is the aptly nicknamed "Burma Street." A common life-course for these Muslims is demonstrated by that of Abdulla. Abdulla's parents were from Yunnan and fled the civil war into Burma. He was born in the town of Lashio in the northern Shan state. At the age of ten his family moved into northern Thailand due to the guerrilla fighting persisting in the country. After living in Thailand for another ten years, he moved to Taiwan in 1974. Several of the men listening to our conversation at the Longkang mosque had moved alongside Abdulla from Burma to Thailand and finally to Taiwan. Also common in the life-course of some Yunnanese is to have lived in Japan for a short time after moving to Taiwan. This is because for some, finding work in Taiwan after arriving was not always easy.

The demographic shifts described above are exemplified in that there are no longer any imams in Taiwan who are the descendants of the original Mainlanders who came directly with the KMT. They are all, with the exception of the head Imam of the Taipei Grand Mosque who is Syrian, of Yunnanese descent born in either Thailand or Burma. The two deputy Imams at the

Taipei Grand Mosque during the summer of research were Imam Ibrahim and Imam Musa. Imam Ibrahim is of Yunnanese descent born in Burma. Prior to taking up his position at the mosque, he spent ten years living in Medina studying Islam and working as a translator. Having a head Imam who is not of Chinese descent is a first in Taiwan. As it stands, the first sermon of *Juma* at the Taipei Grand Mosque is delivered in Mandarin by Imam Ibrahim. The second, longer sermon, is given in English by Imam Omar, with quotes from the Holy Qur'an read in Arabic.

The fourth wave of Islamic migration is the large Indonesian population living in Taiwan. Indonesian migrants now constitute the largest Muslim population in Taiwan. According to the Council of Labour Affairs, there are over 130,000 Indonesian guest workers in Taiwan. In comparison, Vietnamese, Thai and Pilipino guest workers range from 77 to 62 thousand (as cited in Tierney, 2011: 297). All of these migrants are temporary immigrants and often face labour exploitation.

Lacking the rights of Taiwanese citizens often makes it more challenging for them to adhere to their Islamic practices. It is for this reason that Huzun, an Indonesian PhD student living in Taiwan, is trying to rally Indonesian workers to demand the necessary time off of work on Fridays for Juma prayer. With the help of the Chinese Muslim Association, he has published a letter about Islamic practice which Indonesian workers can show their employers. In 2010, the Taipei Times highlighted a case in which the Taiwan's International Workers' Association was protesting for the religious rights of Indonesian workers. The protest was prompted by an instance where two Muslim Indonesian caregivers were told by their employers that they must eat pork (Huang, 2010). Not all Indonesian Muslims in Taiwan are guest workers, however. Some, like Huzun, are students. Some others are recruited by the Taipei Grand Mosque. The

mosque invites Indonesian males and females to volunteer and live and work there on a rotational basis. The growth of the Indonesian population led to the opening of a seventh mosque in Taiwan on June 6th, 2013, in Taoyuan.

In the last thirty years, there has also been growing numbers of expatriates from various Asian and African Islamic countries who came to Taiwan for business and made it their home. It is quite common that these Muslim men have married Native Taiwanese women who have themselves converted to Islam. Some of these men come from Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, Mauritius, Somalia, Tunisia, Mozambique, Jordan and other countries.

Throughout the subsequent waves of Islamic migration to Taiwan, the Taipei Grand Mosque remains the largest and most attended mosque in Taiwan. I was informed that the *Eid al-Fitr* of 2012 was so large that many Muslims prayed across the street in Da'an Park. Despite the fact there are fewer Muslims descended from those who came to Taiwan with the KMT, the Muslim population in Taiwan continues to grow. That the second and third generation Taiwanese Muslims no longer practice Islam is a common topic of conversation for Muslims in Taipei. A quote much like the following is often said when speaking about this situation, "You see so many of the generation who were born on the mainland passing away now, their children bring them to the mosque for funerals who have never themselves been to the mosque and have no idea how to pray". On July 11th, 2013, I participated in a funeral much like the one described by the previous quote. The following is a description of that event:

On July 11th, only a few days into Ramadan, a coffin was wheeled into the prayer hall of the Taipei Grand Mosque after a Dhuhr (the third daily prayer) Imam Omar, the head Imam of the mosque, explained to the brothers in the hall the method for making the Janazah prayer for the deceased. The men who had prayed Dhuhr in the main prayer hall lined up in two rows

facing the coffin. Two women came down from the second floor prayer hall, which is on a balcony overlooking the main hall, to stand behind the men. Imam Omar led the prayer, which consisted of four takbir (part of prayer involving the phrase “Allahu akbar”; “God is great”) and no ruku (bowing) or sujuud (prostrations). Once the prayer was finished brothers rushed forward to help carry the deceased out from the prayer hall to await the arrival of transportation to the cemetery.

While the brothers and sisters were praying, the son and daughter of the deceased were standing in the corridor outside the prayer hall. After Janazah, I went into the hall to speak with them. Shu, the daughter, informed me that her father had asked for an Islamic burial before passing away and had given her the contact information of an old friend. The father’s friend was Zang, an elder Muslim born in China and a regular at Juma prayer. Both Shu and her brother Li told me that they had only ever been to the mosque once before and are not Muslims. However, like many others of their generation, they have maintained an aversion to eating pork. Once the transportation arrived, a small group from the mosque left for the cemetery. The group consisted of Shu, Li, Zang, Imam Omar, Imam Ibrahim, Imam Musa, three Indonesian volunteers working at the Mosque, a young student from Iraq and myself. We drove to the Liuzhangli cemetery located in the hills behind the Taipei Medical University. A section of this gravesite is the resting place for Muslims. Upon arriving Shu was informed by Imam Omar that, according to Islamic law, she was not allowed to be present for the burial, so she had to wait in the van. Her brother jokingly asked if he could also wait by the van. At this, Imam Omar told him that he was needed to hold onto his father’s head as he was lowered into the grave. After walking to the grave, Imam Ibrahim entered the pit to receive the body. The corpse, enshrouded in white cloth, was lowered into the grave by Li and others. Imam Omar asked for a stone to ensure that the deceased was

lying on his right side facing the Qibla (The direction all Muslims face to pray). Once this was finished, another prayer was offered. Following along with the group, Li raised his palms upwards as Imam Omar led the prayer. The gravediggers then filled the grave with cement and the short ceremony was concluded. As we were leaving, Imam Omar told me that the graves were not proper but mixed with local customs. They are not supposed to be raised from the ground more than 26cm and should not be built with anything made from fire, only dirt. He said that local customs had influenced the building of the Muslim graves in the Liuzhangli cemetery.

What struck me about this funeral ceremony was the disconnect between Shu and Li and the burial proceedings of their father. To them, the rituals which they witnessed at the mosque and gravesite have no relation to “Chinese culture.” Their father had asked for a Muslim burial, in which his children, because they are not Muslim, could not fully take part. I was sad for Shu and her brother, who laid their father to rest surrounded by strangers at an unfamiliar ceremony. For Taiwanese like Shu, who no longer practice Islam, it is clear why they would not identify as Hui. The category of Hui implies being a Muslim. In fact the Mandarin *Huijiao* for Islam is literally “Hui religion”. Those who do not practice Islam are seen to have assimilated into the Han *minzu*. One elder Hui born in China spoke about why so few of the second and third generation practice Islam:

It’s because many elderly people died. The second and third generation have been assimilated by other people. Hui and Han are assimilated now. In addition, they’ve never received an Islamic education, knowing nothing about Islam. Everyone is busy for jobs, so gradually people stay far and far away from religious faith.

This response is informative in several ways. First, his reasons for a decrease in the Taiwanese Muslim population reflect the commonly held explanations preferred by Muslims in Taipei. Secondly, by saying that Han and Hui have been assimilated, he is making an important

statement about the nature of ethnicity; that by changing his or her customs (losing a religion and placing work success above faith), the child can be of a different ethnic group than the parent.

Losing their religious tradition is seen as assimilation into the mainstream Han ethnicity.

This example of changing ethnic categories due to changing social experience is similar to the one of Plains Aboriginals becoming Han (Brown, 2004). In order to think about why those descendants of Hui from the mainland have maintained their religion but not a Hui ethnic identity, we can also use this model provided by Brown. My argument is that the social experience of Muslims in Taiwan does not facilitate their self-distinction from other Muslims by identifying as the sub-ethnic group of Hui. Instead they emphasize their ethnicity as Chinese and their religion as Islam.

Chapter 3: Becoming More Muslim: Contemporary Islam in Taiwan

Scholars working in Pakistan and Algeria talked with those working in Britain and France, and charted continuing post-colonial institutional connections. Islam could no longer be plausibly equated with “Middle Eastern Studies” or viewed solely through an Arabic-language lens (or at best an Arabic-Persian-Turkish one) but had to be seen as a set of processes and practices, texts and interpretations, that were constantly in conflict with, and also adapted to, culturally specific ways of living and thinking located around the globe (Bowen, 2012: 9).

This chapter aims to show that interpretations of Islam in Taiwan have changed over the course of subsequent generations. These changes are due to new social experiences and contexts to which Islam is being applied in individual lives. In *A New Anthropology of Islam*, Bowen (2012) argues that anthropologists studying Islam should not make the claim that an individual’s actions are due to Islamic culture, nor should we make the reverse claim that a practice is due to local culture as opposed to Islam. Instead, anthropologists should look at how Muslims organize their lives around their understanding of Islam; how they use the resources of Islam to shape practice (6). In this sense “Islam is best seen as a set of interpretive resources and practices” (Bowen, 2012: 3).

Clifford Geertz (1968) provided early inspiration for this type of analysis. In *Islam Observed*, Geertz compared two areas, Morocco and Java, to show that Islam emerges out of interpretations which make sense to people in particular moments. As a criticism of Geertz, Talal Asad (1986) showed that powerful religious figures can have a great influence by promoting or suppressing certain interpretations of Islam. Bowen (2012) does not see these two ideas as opposed, rather that together they provide a framework which takes into consideration tensions existing in any societal context (7). It is my view that there are similar flaws in Barth’s theory of ethnicity and Geertz’s theory of religion, in that they both did not put enough emphasis on power

from above. Those that came after took these models and applied a more nuanced approach. When looking at identities, be they religious, ethnic, or national, it is important to look at how individuals navigate their own meanings from social experience. This includes the meanings being given by those deemed to be representatives or gatekeepers of knowledge about the group. To those who submit to Islam and try to model their lives around its guidelines, they present their religion as a set of rules which many Muslims fail to adhere to. They believe in a “true” Islam which certain features of behaviour and belief are in line with and others are not. Practices seen as not Islamic performed by people who identify as Muslims are seen as local cultural influences on Islam.

In the context of Taipei, the belief that some practice “true” Islam plays a crucial role in how individuals interpret their religion. A primary example of this is the prevalent notion in Taipei that there are multiple levels of understanding of Islam based on where a Muslim originates. Taiwanese Muslims descended from Mainlanders are perceived to have a lesser understanding of Islam by many Muslims in Taipei, including some Mainlanders themselves. A second generation Mainlander and former Imam said he believed a reason why many descendants of those who came over with the KMT no longer practice Islam is because their fathers did not have a good understanding of the religion when they lived in China. He asserted that those who lived in Yunnan and fled to Burma have a better understanding of Islam due to its presence in South East Asia. Finally, those who have arrived more recently from various African and Asian Islamic countries have an even greater understanding of Islam. Some Taiwanese Muslims admitted that their ancestors had lost much understanding of Islam in China. They expressed gratitude towards learning about Islam from Muslims coming to Taiwan from Islamic countries.

On other occasions, some men who have migrated to Taiwan from Islamic nations in Africa expressed to me their frustrations with the haphazard, or *suibian*, way Islam is sometimes practiced in Taiwan. This could range from individuals not praying properly, or the *iftar* meal not being prepared in a way that facilitates fasting (the dishes being too oily in the Chinese style). The implication of these beliefs is that those who were raised in countries where Islam is the primary religion have a better understanding of it because they would be less influenced by local culture. Bowen (2012) challenges anthropologists to consider that there is no objective Islam; Islam and local culture cannot but merge in any context Muslims find themselves (2). However, for anthropologists, these claims to authenticity are ways of understanding how Muslims interpret Islam. When Bowen (2012) says that Islam is a set of interpretations, he asserts that these interpretations come specifically from religious scripture (6).

The predominant writings for these interpretations are the Qur'an and the *ahadith* (Hadith). The Hadith are published writings by early Muslims about the life of the Prophet Muhammad. The reason for the importance of the Hadith is that Muslims should base their lives around the life of the Prophet. In Taipei I often heard the statement that Islam is a simple religion to follow. There are the Qur'an and Hadith, which have not changed since their writing and proscribe the proper way to live. Of course it is not that simple and these texts can be interpreted in multiple ways. As a simple example, based on the writings in the Hadith, some Muslims in Taipei believe that men should grow their beards long and shave their upper lip. On the other hand, also based on a Hadith, is the view that the Prophet Muhammad emphasized the importance of hygiene and at certain times in his life shaved his beard short, and therefore a close cropped beard is acceptable. Following the interpretation of the importance of hygiene is the practice of wearing scents and placing some perfume on clothing before prayer.

To summarize, Bowen (2012) asserts that understanding how Muslims interpret scripture and incorporate it into their lives is the key to studying Islamic cultures. It is implied in this enterprise that the Islamic practices we are studying as anthropologists are hybrids. Luckily for anthropologists, Islam is a religion that prizes doing over understanding, as the many examples of Muslims appearing a certain way according to the Sunna attest. Islam is a religion which dictates how individuals should act and be in the world; how to dress, eat, worship, behave towards others and so on. That Islam is a religion of action is a reason why learning to read the Qur'an is of paramount importance to Muslims. It may seem that the reason for this is quite obvious, in order to *understand* Islam. However, the ability to read the Arabic scriptures in the Qur'an is not the only path to understanding Islam. Also, being able to understand the words in the Qur'an does not necessarily equate to understanding Islam. Instead, Muslims need to be able to recite at least small portions of the Qur'an in order to pray. Without memorization of the Arabic pronunciation of certain *sura* (chapters), Muslims cannot pray. Without the ability to pray, a Muslim cannot be a Muslim. What this means is that many Muslims around the world, including Taiwan, can read the Qur'an but do not understand the words.

Interpreting the Hadith or Qur'an a certain way does not necessary lead to direct implementation of these in someone's life. It may happen that a Muslim man with a shaved face may believe that Muslim men should grow their beards. Or, a Muslim woman who does not wear the *hijab* in public may say that woman should wear it in public. Both of these instances occurred during my research. In cases like this, we must look at the social experiences of these individuals that influence their choices. As Bowen (2012) points out, Islamic interpretations are always negotiated in ways that allow them to fit into local context (4).

As Pillsbury (1973) demonstrated, the Hui had to adapt their diets and thus religious and ethnic boundaries to fit the local context. Before moving on to further examples which show that changing social experiences of being a Muslim in Taiwan have shaped identity I will provide some ethnographic text which will help situate my arguments.

3.1: Islamic practice and Muslim interactions in Taipei

Islam has “Five Pillars” which are fundamental to a Muslim’s life. The first pillar is the acknowledgement that there is only one God and that Muhammad is the final messenger of God. The second pillar is *salat* which is to worship God. Although *salat* is often translated as praying, Muslims do not actually “pray” to God during *salat*, although they may request supplications to God (*du’a*) after worship. Muslims are required to make *salat* at least five times daily. This involves, depending on the time of worship, a certain amount of ritual cycles involving specific movements and recitations from the Qur’an. In order for the worship to be accepted by God, the Muslim must be in a state of ritual cleanliness by performing ablutions before *salat*. This involves the washing of certain body parts in a prescribed order and amount. Secondly, Muslims must have the correct intention when worshipping God. The mind should not wander when worshipping God; Muslims must be sincere in their ritual. The third pillar of Islam is to donate a share of one’s wealth annually in order to alleviate the poverty of others. This act also serves the purpose of a ritual cleansing of one’s wealth. The final two pillars are fasting during the month of Ramadan and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime.

Interactions between Muslims in Taipei are often centred on discussions of proper Islamic behaviour. At times, these can become quite heated and lead to friction between Muslims or groups of Muslims when the outcome can greatly affect lives. Over the course of this research,

one Imam working at the Taipei Grand Mosque was put under great pressure from others because his father, a first generation Hui, did not pray properly. His argument was that his father was in his eighties and it was not his place to judge his father's method of prayer. This same Imam was criticized by women who said that his daughter had taken her hijab off in the prayer hall. The Imam eventually resigned his position. This example is a strong one as most debates about correct Islam are more amicable. The following sections will provide more examples which showcase the debates which surround Islamic practices in Taipei. Also, they will build on the themes which are that the Muslim Mainlanders have had to adapt their Islamic practices in order to fit the context of contemporary Islam in Taipei.

Halal Taiwan food expo

June 28th, my second day of field research in Taipei, was a Friday. Juma, the congregational prayer which Muslims attend on Fridays, starts around 12 o'clock at the Taipei Grand Mosque. It is the one prayer out of the week in which Muslims are obliged to pray at a mosque. Aside from prayer, Juma is also a time for Muslim brothers and sisters to come together in a festive atmosphere. Once prayer is finished at the Taipei Grand Mosque, many people will stay and have lunch in the dining hall or simply talk with friends. Others will stay in the prayer hall to continue praying on their own or to listen to an Imam speak. For lunch, various Halal restaurants located near the mosque will close and bring prepared food to be sold in the dining hall. The food served consists of either prepackaged snacks, such as samosas, or sit down meals, usually beef or chicken with vegetables served over rice. There is also raw Halal beef and chicken sold for Muslims to take home for the week ahead. Certain restaurants also offer the service of selling Halal meat.

Today, like every Friday spent in Taipei, I participated in Juma prayer at the Taipei Grand Mosque. Once the prayer was finished, I made my way outside where sister Khadija had set up a booth to recruit people to go to the Halal expo and perform da'wa. The Halal expo has been part of the Taipei International Food Show since 2009. It is a chance for Taiwan-based Halal food businesses to market their products. With a group of others, I went to the expo being held at the Taipei World Trade Centre to perform da'wa by handing out Islamic flyers and speaking to people about Islam. I was driven to the expo by a man named Ahmad Ma. Ahmad is of Yunnanese heritage but grew up in Thailand and moved to Taiwan about 20 years ago. He is married to Saida, a second generation Taiwanese whose parents both come from Muslim families. In the car was also Jahiz and Sahira, a Pakistani couple who have been living in Taiwan for several years.

The Halal section of the food expo consisted of several stalls marketing various products. Jahiz, Sahira and I walked throughout the food expo handing out Islamic flyers for a time. Just after four o'clock it was time to pray. Jahiz, Ahmad Ma, another man named Tahir and I went into the public washroom to wash ourselves according to *wudu*. Wudu is the ritual of cleansing oneself before prayer or touching the Qur'an. In order to properly perform ablution we used the sinks in the public washroom, which was somewhat challenging when washing the feet. In the Halal expo, prayer rooms had been set up for both men and women. The men's prayer room had one rug which was used by Ahmad Ma, who would lead the prayer. The three of us stood behind him in a line. An arrow pointing to the Qibla had been placed in the room to make it clear which way needed to be faced. After prayer, we left as a group to a rented apartment nicknamed Fatimah's house for dinner. Fatimah's house is rented by Khadija as a place for young Muslim

girls to come and learn about Islam in a safe environment. It also serves as a headquarters of sorts for organizing Islamic events and having discussions about promoting Islam in Taiwan.

Khadija is a Native Taiwanese woman who has converted to Islam and is married to a Sudanese man. She converted in 1995. At first, her family was resistant to her conversion to Islam. She said that the first year was hard, but that afterwards her family came to appreciate and understand her decision. Khadija is now an active promoter of Islam in Taiwan and worries about the ability of young Muslims to maintain the faith. She believes that if children spend 35 hours a week in school, compared to only two hours a week learning about Islam at the mosque on Sundays, they will inevitably be influenced by the overwhelmingly non-Islamic mainstream Taiwanese society. It is for this reason that she has rented a few apartments in Taipei where youth can come learn about Islam in a more conducive environment. Her ultimate goal is to one day open an Islamic school in Taipei.

Also at dinner were Ahmad Ma's wife Saida, and Rakeem, another converted Native Taiwanese who has been to Saudi Arabia to study Islam. Zabir, an Indonesian hairdresser was also there. Although not the custom for many Muslims, men and women ate together, sharing the dishes which had been prepared by Rakeem and Ahmad Ma. As there were no tables large enough to accommodate the group, we spread newspapers on the floor and ate sitting on the ground. Jahiz mentioned that in Islam it was better to eat with one's hands and so some chose to eat without utensils. He was also clearly disconcerted that the men and women were not segregated for the meal. After eating, we talked about the state of Islam in the world. At this, Khadija expressed that all Muslims in Taiwan, regardless of their respective backgrounds, are brothers and sisters and that it is thankful that they live in Taiwan.

In his research on Muslim diasporas, Thurfjell (2010) has found that converts often play important roles within Muslim communities. Khadija is one example as she is determined to promote Islam in Taiwan. She organizes events where Muslims can come together to discuss and learn their religion. On a separate occasion, she invited a former Imam to Fatimah's house to give advice on explaining Islam to non-Muslims. This talk was focused on how to make the point that all religions have members who would do others harm. It is recognized by the Muslims in Taipei that the reputation of Islam in the non-Islamic world has been damaged. I believe this is part of what has led to a desire to practice Islam correctly. The vast majority of Muslims who believe that Islam is a peaceful religion are eager to display this side of it.

On one occasion at the Taipei Grand Mosque, some Christians from a nearby church came to talk about religion. The discussion was interrupted when it was time to pray. While the brothers were praying, the Christians began to pray in the mosque's meeting room. This was witnessed by one Muslim man who became angry and told the Christians to leave. When those who had been talking with the Christians returned and found out why they were no longer in the mosque, they were dismayed. They told the Muslim man that it had been wrong to tell them to leave because building dialogue is the best thing for Islam.

Muslims in Taipei are constantly negotiating their religion and attributing meaning to it, which makes sense in particular moments. As this section has shown, there is much diversity in the Muslim population in Taipei. This adds another dimension to the interactions which take place between Muslims as they try to find common ground through which they can relate to each other and to their religion. We can see that for Jahiz, men and women eat in separate spheres and with their right hand. However these customs are not widely practiced in Taiwan and may have

not have been integrated into the Islamic practices of many Taiwanese. The following ethnographic examples will further expand on these situated interpretations.

Ramadan

Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. During this month, it is mandatory for Muslims who are able to fast to do so. *Sawm*, fasting during the month of Ramadan, is one of the Five Pillars of Islam. Fasting as a method involves refraining from consuming any drink or food during daylight. During this month, Muslims are encouraged to become more devout in their religious faith and practice. Some Muslims in Taipei took the month off of work in order to spend more time at the mosque praying and reflecting on their life and religion. A young student from Indonesia spoke to me about how he enjoyed this month because it provided him with the opportunity to reflect on his life and on the mistakes he made over the previous year. Fasting for him and many others is a type of purification they can make each year. They are reminded during this time of the particular importance to avoid certain sinful social taboos in Islam such as backbiting or lying. Aside from individual self reflection, Muslims also come together communally more often during Ramadan. At the Taipei Grand Mosque, a few hundred Muslim brothers and sisters came together nightly to break their fast together and to pray. August 2nd was a Friday Juma which occurred during the last ten days of Ramadan. During Ramadan, more Muslims will spend time at mosques and attendance at the five daily prayers will be larger. Additional nightly prayers occur after *Isha*. These are called *Tarawih* and *Witr*, and they differ from the five daily prayers in that the recitation of verses from the Qur'an will be much longer. Each *rakaat* (cycle of prayer) is made up of a period in which sura are recited by the individual or by the Imam. During Tarawih, several longer sura may be recited during each rakaat. For this reason a *Hafiz* (someone practiced at reciting the Qur'an from memory) will usually lead these

prayers. I was told that, during the previous year's Ramadan, an ambitious Hafiz wanted to get through the entire Qur'an over the course of the monthly Tarawih prayers. This meant hours of praying each night, often finishing late into the evening. This year the Imams at the Grand Mosque decided that Tarawih would consist of 8 rakaat. The Culture Mosque prayed a 16 rakaat Tarawih.

Walking up to the Taipei Grand Mosque around 11:45am, there are several people standing outside chatting. Directly inside the main doors there is a table on the right which has various books and pamphlets about Islam and the history of Islam in Taiwan. On the left there is a billboard with notices printed in Chinese, English and Arabic. After entering the mosque I made my way down to the men's washroom where there is a central wudu tap. I took my seat next to other men and performed wudu, the ritual Islamic ablution which must be done before prayer. Once finished I made my way back towards the prayer hall and put my sandals on one of the shelves just outside the main prayer hall. The men's prayer hall is on the first floor of the Taipei Grand Mosque directly in front of the main entrance doors. The women's prayer room is on the second floor balcony overlooking the larger men's hall. Upon entering the prayer hall, I found a place among the others and performed the obligatory two rakaat before sitting down near the back.

In order for there to be enough room in the hall, the two cloth enclosures which had been set up along the side wall for *itikaf* have been taken down temporarily. Itikaf is optional for Muslims to take part in and takes place over the last ten days of Ramadan. For the course of these ten days, the men must not leave the mosque. Aside from eating and using the washroom, they should stay in the enclosure which has been set up and worship by praying or reading the

Qur'an. The purpose of the itikaf is to allow one a personal retreat in which a Muslim can become closer to God.

This year there were two participants at the Taipei Grand Mosque¹⁷. One of these men is Lin Bao, who has lived in Taiwan for twelve years. In 1949, his father left Yunnan for Burma, where he stayed and married a local woman. Lin Bao, who was born in 1954, was one of thirteen children. His father taught him Mandarin when he was a child, although Burmese was the language most commonly spoken at home. In Taunggyi township of the northern Shan state where he grew up, Islam had a strong presence due to large number of Indian and Pakistani Muslims living there. Something which is quite commonly spoken about from the Muslims born in Burma is that they had good access to an Islamic education in their youth. Because of this, Islamic belief is strong amongst those like Lin Bao. Although he has never been to Yunnan he has been on the Hajj twice, and *inshallah* would like to go a third time. For the ten days of itikaf, he brought a backpack with clothing and a light in order to read the Qur'an late into the night. He usually prefers to return to Burma for Ramadan; however, due to the ongoing struggles between Buddhists and Muslims in the country, he chose to stay in Taiwan this year.

Although the Juma is scheduled for noon, there are a few people in the prayer hall at 11:50am. Sitting near me are elder Hui Muslims, those who were born in China and came over with the KMT government. This group of men are familiar with each other and will attend Juma prayer each Friday. One of the men is Zang, who was present at the funeral I attended on July 11th. Zang is a KMT veteran born in Wuhan. As usual, when he enters the mosque he replaces the straw cigar hat which he always wears outside for his yellow *taqiyah* (the Muslim prayer cap). Some of the older Muslim men are also sitting in green chairs which are placed along the side

¹⁷ Both men who participated in itikaf were of Yunnanese descent and had migrated to Taiwan from Burma.

walls of the mosque for those who have physical trouble standing or kneeling to pray. Sitting next to me in the back is Ma Chai whose father was Ma Dunjing (馬敦靜), and grandfather Ma Hongkui (馬鴻逵). Ma Dunjing was a general in the KMT army fighting the communists and was part of the Recovery of the Mainland Research Commission in Taiwan. Ma Hongkui on the other hand, was the Governor of Ningxia province in China and also left after the communist take-over. During the Republican era he was recruited by Bai Chongxi to join the KMT cause in fighting the Japanese. Ma Chai himself was born in Lanzhou and is therefore “*Gansunese*” (referring to his provincial origins). Every few years he returns to Gansu to visit relatives and he has also been to Mecca twice. Like others of his generation who were born on the mainland, Ma maintains his Hui ethnicity. While I am sitting and talking with him he continues to greet those he knows with “*assalaamu alaykum*” as they come in.

At twelve o’clock, more people are still filling into the prayer hall and performing their two rakaat before sitting down. The call to prayer is performed by Taliq, a Pakistani man who has been working at the mosque for many years. At this point there are 45 people in the mosque. After the *adhan* is complete, Imam Ibrahim moves to the front and delivers a short sermon in Mandarin. He is wearing his usual plaid shirt and khakis with a white prayer cap. Ma Chai next to me admits that he cannot understand what is being said because of the differences between his Mandarin accent and the Yunnanese accent of Imam Ibrahim. Once Imam Ibrahim is finished, the second *adhan* is called and Imam Omar comes to the minbar to deliver his sermon. Imam Omar begins by reciting lines from the Qur’an in Arabic. He then translates these into English and provides explanations on their importance. Today’s sermon is about paying the *Zakat al-Fitr*. This is one of two obligatory donations made by all Muslims each year. *Zakat*, as one of the Five Pillars of Islam, requires all Muslims to donate a share of their wealth every year in order to

alleviate the poverty of others. Zakat al-Fitr is a donation made before the end of Ramadan. He said that one who has not made this donation has left Islam, as it is obligatory. When the sermon was finished, Imam Omar led the brothers and sisters in du'a. After du'a, the congregation stood up and moved forward to fill any gaps between men so that all in the hall are standing in rows shoulder to shoulder. At this point there are about 500 men in the prayer hall and more praying on mats which have been laid out in the hallway outside the main doors. After the completion of the two rakaat Juma prayer, some leave the hall while others perform additional rakaat on their own. Since it is Ramadan, the food that is served in the dining hall consists of only the pre-packaged and raw Halal meats. Outside many brothers and sisters have stayed after prayer to socialize with friends and enjoy the festive atmosphere that is present at the mosque every Friday. As it is Ramadan, some also stay until *Asr* prayer which will be at 4:30pm. Following *Asr* is *Maghrib*, which will be at 6:40pm, marking an end to fasting for the evening.

Once the sun starts to wan around 6:00pm, the mosque is very busy again. Rows with plastic sheets have been laid out with dates and water. Those in the prayer hall are sitting down talking or reading the Qur'an. At 6:45pm it is time to break the fast and the rows are full of seated Muslim men. Du'a is made by Imam Omar and then the dates and water are quickly consumed and the plastic sheets are removed from the prayer hall. The congregation moves to the front of the hall to pray *Maghrib*. Imam Omar once again leads the brothers and sisters in the three rakaat prayer. Once this is finished, some exit the prayer hall to go eat while others stay behind and pray additional rakaat on their own before going to the dining hall. Outside the dining hall, dishes with meat and rice have been prepared and are being handed to each man as he enters. Inside the dining room there are twenty tables all laid out with various dishes, rice and bread. This communal dinner, called *iftar*, takes place every night during the month of Ramadan to

break the fast. The women eat in the smaller reception hall located down the opposite corridor of the mosque. In general, there is very little interaction at the mosque between men and women. It is the norm that, even while not praying, men and women will form separate realms of interaction. For iftar, I sat down with Zhong. Zhong was born in Anhui and moved to Taiwan in 1949. He spent much of his life working at the Kaohsiung mosque. After retiring, he moved back to China and lives in Lanzhou. He was in Taipei over the course of Ramadan to receive medical treatment. Zhong has visited many mosques and Muslim communities around the world, in countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. He is unhappy about the fate of Islam in Taiwan, in which he believes the Hui have been assimilated into Han culture.

Once I am finished eating, I pour myself some hot milk tea from the canister in the dining hall and move outside to sit on the steps leading up to the mosque. In front of the steps there is a grassy area where children are playing soccer as they have every night of Ramadan. The children are of all different age groups and nationalities. As the majority of them have been born in Taiwan, they will usually converse in Mandarin. Sitting next to me is Sajid, a Tibetan Muslim. His family fled the Cultural Revolution for Kashmir and he has since made his way to Taiwan for business. Also outside is Ma Rong with his wife and family. Ma inherited a Beijing style Halal restaurant from his father. During Ramadan he came to the Taipei Grand Mosque to sell his food after iftar. Ma is a second generation Muslim Mainlander who did not learn about Islam in his youth. It is due to his coming to the mosque that he started to pray during Ramadan. Also he brought his son into the prayer hall to pray with him. His wife, having not come from a Muslim family herself, is not a Muslim. She does, however, wear a scarf over her head when she comes to the mosque. At 8 o'clock it was time for Isha prayer, and so the brothers and sisters went back into their prayer halls and prayed one more time.

During Ramadan there are additional prayers after Isha. These are Tarawih and Witr and they involve longer Qur'anic recitations in each rakaat. They are often performed by those who are skilled at memorizing the Qur'an, a Hafiz. Over the course of Ramadan, the Taipei Grand Mosque had various brothers come and lead these prayers. Today it was Abdularaham from Somalia leading. In his youth, Abdularaham participated in Qur'anic recitation competitions. In one such competition involving boys from 80 countries, he finished second. After these prayers were finished, ice cream was served in the dining hall. After finishing my ice cream, I headed back to my apartment for a short rest. In the last ten days of Ramadan, an additional prayer, *Tahajud*, was conducted at 2:00am at the Taipei Grand Mosque. At 1:50am, when I returned to the mosque, there were some men asleep in the prayer hall. In the end, twenty men prayed the Tahajud together. After prayer we went back to the dining hall and ate *suhoor*, the last meal before fasting again for the day. Lin Bao ate his chicken with only his right hand, removing all the meat from the bone in a more challenging method. Here the few men and women at the mosque ate together at tables in the hall. At 4:00am, it was time for *Fajr* prayer, after this I returned to my apartment for some much needed sleep.

As can be seen from this section, many of the first generation Muslim Mainlanders still maintain that they are Hui. According to Pillsbury (1973), this entails self-ascription as part of a separate ethnic group. During interviews with Zhong, he spoke of the acculturation of Hui into Han. This was something which Pillsbury (1973) commented as the main anxiety in Taipei's Muslim population (265). For younger generations, the conceptualization of a Hui ethnic group has faded. Even the recognition that their parents may have been Hui does not necessarily mean that they themselves are. Although Saida recognizes that her parents are *huizu*, she stated the following regarding her own identity:

I don't care about it, for me it doesn't mean anything. Because in Taiwan we don't have these *zu*, we have like Waishengren and Benshengren and Aborigines. If I went to China than maybe you could say I was *huizu*, but I have no connection to it. I think the important thing is Muslim, Islam, not this or that *zu*.

Lin Chang-kuan (2013) believes that Mainlanders identify as *huizu* because they do not understand the politics behind this term (29). For him, being Hui is a distinctly Chinese (mainland Chinese) phenomenon with no relation to Islam. This seems to be the view being adopted by second and third generation Mainlanders as they connect, in multiple ways, with a global Islam.

Halal Restaurants in Taipei

Over the course of my two months in Taipei, I carried out field research at various Halal restaurants. In order to keep Muslims informed on which restaurants they can eat at, the Chinese Muslim Association provides Halal food certificates for which owners can apply. The CMA has also published a brochure which lists the names and addresses of these restaurants. In this section, I would like to highlight and compare two restaurants which I frequented throughout my research, with the exception of the month of Ramadan.

The first restaurant is called Ai-jia Beef Noodle Shop. The owner, a man named Jusuf, was born in the Chinese province of Henan and came to Taiwan with the KMT. Shortly after arriving, he opened this restaurant. The primary food served is the beef noodle soup which has become so popular in Taiwan. Although originating in the Muslim dominated north east of China, it made its way to Taiwan after WWII and has become one of Taiwan's most popular foods. Jusuf's wife and three children also work at the restaurant. On July 1, I had lunch with Dr. Ibrahim Chao, a respected Muslim in Taiwan and his friend, a Muslim man from Hong Kong. The two men had previously met in Mecca during a Hajj pilgrimage. Upon entering the

restaurant, they greeted Jusuf with the customary “*assalaamu alaykum*” and “*wa alaykum assalaam*”. These are the most common forms of greetings for Muslims in Taipei. Greetings such as “hello” or “*ni hao*” seem inappropriate and out of place. Dr. Ibrahim Chao was born in China in 1947 and then moved with his family to Taiwan in 1949. In 1963, he was fortunate to be selected with four other classmates to study at an Islamic university in Libya. After studying there for ten years, he wished to further his Islamic education and so continued to study. He received his Master’s and PhD in Islamic Jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Chao served as an Imam in Taiwan for 20 years but is now retired.

Throughout my visits to Ai-jia, I came to know the daughter of Jusuf, Chun. She maintains her Muslim identity, although in practice she would not appear to be Islamic. In terms of clothing, she does not adhere to Islamic guidelines and, when asked, she said that she could not remember the Islamic name she had been given in her childhood. During Ramadan she did not fast, stating that she was too busy at the restaurant. Jusuf and his family have not made the pilgrimage to Mecca although they hope to, but remain busy managing their restaurant. When asked, Chun responded that she considers herself Muslim, but in practice does not live an Islamic life. Islam is a set of beliefs and practices which can be adopted and given meaning in various situations and by various individuals. Chun maintains a Muslim identity due to her working in a Halal restaurant and coming into frequent contact with Muslims. For her, she is Muslim because her father was a Muslim from China. This view is adopted by many second and third generation Mainlanders whose parents were Muslim but who themselves do not *enact* Islam in life.

The second restaurant I would like to profile is called Tai Huang. The owner of the restaurant is named Tai. Along with his wife, sister-in-law and son, he works hard maintaining

the restaurant while also acting as groundskeeper for the Taipei Grand Mosque. On some of the late nights at the mosque, he would be there watering the gardens before coming in to pray. He and his son were some of the brothers who came to the 2:00am Tahajud prayers during Ramadan. Tai's parents were born in Yunnan province of China and moved to Burma after the Communists came to power. He was born in Burma but moved to Thailand with his family when he was ten years old. In Thailand, he lived in Chiang Mai where there is a large Yunnanese Muslim population. They lived in Thailand for 30 years before Tai moved to Taiwan. It was in Taiwan that he and his wife met and married. In 2000, Tai and his family made the pilgrimage to Mecca. It was a great time for him as he described being with so many Muslims and seeing the holy mosque as a blessing, *Alhamdulillah*. Along the walls of Tai Huang there are many pictures of the Qibla.

In contrasting Tai with Chun, it is apparent that Tai's Islamic practices are stricter. Although both individuals identify as Muslims, their interpretations of Islam vary greatly. It is a commonly held belief in Taipei that Yunnanese Muslims who grew up in either Burma or Thailand have a greater understanding of Islam than those who migrated to Taiwan from China. Although this may be the case, it is more productive as an anthropologist to consider the social contexts which have fostered various interpretations of Islam (Bowen, 2012: 4-5). Chun's view of Islam resembles that of second and third generation Muslims who no longer practice Islam or identify as Muslims.

I was fortunate during my time in Taipei to be able to conduct several interviews with second generation Mainlanders whose fathers were Muslim but are not themselves. There are multiple reasons why first generation Mainlanders would not have taught their children about Islam. These reasons revolve around the themes of military life, lack of Muslim women to marry,

lack of availability of Islamic education and competitiveness of youth education in Taiwan.

Omar Yang, Chairman of the Taipei Grand Mosque, informed me that of those Muslims who came to Taiwan, the vast majority of those who passed on a belief in Islam to their children were not in the military. One reason for this is that the ratio of men to women who came to Taiwan was far greater among military personnel than non-military (Yang & Chang, 2010: 120). This led to more than half of the soldiers marrying Native Taiwanese women (Yang & Chang, 2010: 120). Because Taiwanese society is patrilineal, the children of these Native Taiwanese women would have been regarded as Mainlanders (Hu, 1989: 255). In regards to religion, these statistics also show that many Muslim soldiers would have been marrying non-Muslims if they choose to marry at all. Furthermore, the KMT veterans were largely part of the lower class and would have been preoccupied with more than teaching their wives and children about Islam (Hu, 1989: 262-263). They may not have had as much time to be home, as they would have been living with the army. On the other hand, high ranking government military officials may have had the means to bring their families to Taiwan (Hu, 1989: 262).

Still, for those who strive to teach their children about Islam, there are obstacles. As of yet, there are no Islamic schools in Taiwan for children and youth. One option for parents is to bring their children to the Taipei Grand Mosque every Sunday for a two hour class which focuses on prayer, reading the Qur'an, and listening to stories from the Hadith. Also, the Chinese Muslim Association offers Islamic summer camps. In spite of these courses, all of the adult interview respondents mentioned the difficulty in finding time for their children to learn about Islam because of the busy and competitive education system in Taiwan. As one respondent said:

Since elementary school, I don't even want to mention junior high and senior high, the kids are so competitive. How can the parents ask their kids to come to the mosque? After they graduate from university, Islam will not get them a job. This is very basic. You don't even need to mention it, but everyone just puts it in their heart.

This was a common sentiment throughout the Islamic community. Many Taiwanese Muslims reported being not fully committed to their Islamic duties while in school. It was only after university, when they started working, that they started to adhere more strictly to Islamic guidelines. This speaks to something very important about those descendants of Muslims from China. The majority of those in Taipei are Muslims because at some point in their adult lives they made the decision to make an effort to learn about Islam and to be a Muslim. The ones who have done this feel a strong connection to Islam. In some ways it would have been much easier to choose not to be Muslim. During interviews, many respondents discussed the point in their lives when they started praying five times a day and attending the mosque more frequently.

Nasu is one youth who has just finished his mandatory military training and decided, with his mother, to start practicing Islam. It was important to him because of the early influence he received from his mother's father, who was a Muslim soldier from Hebei. Like many other Muslim men of his generation, Nasu's grandfather married a Native Taiwanese non-Muslim. Although in his youth Nasu would often see his grandfather praying, his grandmother and mother never themselves became Muslim or learned about Islam. From interviews with second and third generation Mainlanders, I learned that it was quite common for Hui Muslims to view Islam as their religion and not something their wives needed to convert to or that their children needed to learn. However, it also seems common that although many second generation Mainlanders did not learn about Islam from their fathers, they did acquire the habit of abstaining from pork. Pork was not eaten in the household of Nasu's grandparents and so he learned to not eat it. During his military training he opted to be on the vegetarian diet in order to avoid the meat. Beyond abstaining from pork, Nasu was unfamiliar with the world of Islam. After the passing of

his grandfather, with whom Nasu had a good relationship, he took the initiative to volunteer with the Chinese Muslim Association and to get lessons on how to pray from one of the imam's. He also chose an Islamic name for himself.

The importance of Nasu's story is that second and third generation Taiwanese Muslims often have personal reasons for being a Muslim which manifest after they finish their university studies. This is by no means a universal, as some second generation Taiwanese were brought up to be Muslim. This trend however seems almost exclusively reserved to those who were raised in families with more than one Muslim parent. Saida was fortunate in that both of her parents were Muslims from China who met and married in Taiwan. She expressed that her family would always eat in their home because of the difficulty in finding Halal food. Saida has studied Islam in Malaysia and has been on the Hajj. She described the Hajj as an event which heightened her sense of living in accordance with Islam. Seeing so many people of different nations, with different dress and languages, but all sharing their Muslim faith, was described by her and many other Hajji as a wonderful time.

From the previous conclusions and from what Chairman Omar Yang said about mostly non-soldiers passing on a belief in Islam, it can be discerned that most of those who have carried on a tradition of Islam came from a relatively higher socio-economic status. As Hu's (1989) study points out, most of the KMT veterans were in the lower social class amongst Mainlanders. Only those soldiers and officials of higher social-economic status may have had the means of bringing Muslim wives with them to Taiwan (Hu, 1989: 262) or of marrying Muslim women once they reached the island. Also, they would have had more resources for their children to learn about Islam. In Taipei, many of the second generation Taiwanese Muslims have been on the Hajj or, in some cases, have spent years living in Islamic countries to receive an Islamic

education. This and the influence that new Muslims to Taiwan are having on the community have created a sense of renewal for Taiwanese Muslims wanting to increase their faith or “correct” their practice.

This research has also shown that interpretations on what is “correct” Islam is constantly being negotiated through interpersonal interactions. These interpretations are often mediated through those who are deemed to be leaders or gatekeepers of Islamic knowledge. As Bowen (2012) has stated, Muslims can also derive these meanings from Islamic scripture (4). The following section will provide evidence of this.

Eid al-Fitr, August 8th and 9th:

Eid al-Fitr is an Islamic holy day marking the end of Ramadan. Eid takes place on the first day of the new month of Shawwal. For the Muslims in Taipei, it is the one day of the year which will bring the most people together at the mosques. So far in the thesis, I have refrained from mentioning the friction that is present between some members of the Muslim community. Without going into too much detail, I will preface the next event by saying that differences of opinion by leaders of the two mosques in Taipei led to a situation in which Eid was celebrated on two separate days. Eid marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan and is an important holy day each year for Muslims. As the Islamic calendar is based on the lunar cycle, the new month begins with the new moon. Some controversy exists as to whether or not the new moon needs to be sighted by the human eye or not in order to mark the end of Ramadan. What has become common in much of the world is to celebrate Eid on the same day it is celebrated in Saudi Arabia. This was the reasoning behind the Culture Mosque celebrating Eid on August 8th. Leaders at the Taipei Grand Mosque believed that seeing the new moon with their own eyes should determine whether or not Eid would be on the 8th or 9th. Therefore some members of the mosque drove to

the coast of Taiwan to wait and see if the new moon would appear. As it happened, the moon did not become visible and Eid was postponed until the following day. The controversy over the date of Eid led to a few disputes among Muslims as to whether or not it should be mandatory to see the new moon or if knowing that a new moon was present using modern technology was satisfactory.

On the morning of August 8, I woke up and left for the Taipei Grand Mosque thinking that Eid would be celebrated on that day. The news that the new moon had not been seen occurred late the previous night and so I was not yet informed about the plans to celebrate Eid on the 9th. As I walked up to the mosque, I noticed that there were only a few people outside. Some of them had also come for Eid but it was explained to us that it would not be until tomorrow. However, the Culture Mosque was celebrating it today. During my two months of field research in Taipei, I had often prayed at both mosques and had eaten iftar at the Culture Mosque a few times during Ramadan. Iftar at the culture mosque had been organized by a group of Pakistani Muslims in Taipei. The food had been prepared in Pakistani style and was eaten by hand. Breakfast was served in the basement of the mosque for the men and outside in the courtyard for the women. On one occasion, a delicious mutton curry was served with side dishes of vegetables and roti. The dishes were served on large platters shared communally. After finding out that Eid would be celebrated today, I walked to the Culture Mosque in order to observe the prayer. Since the Culture Mosque prayer hall is much smaller than the Grand Mosque, the Eid prayer had to be done multiple times. As I walked up the steps, many were sitting outside waiting for the prayer to finish so they could take their turn. I spoke with one brother who thought it quite shocking that Eid would be celebrated on different days at the two mosques, which are only a few kilometres

apart. Once the prayer was finished, those sitting down rose and those from inside the prayer hall came outside. Everyone embraced and exchanged the words “*Eid mubarak*”.

On the morning of August 9th I arrived at the Taipei Grand Mosque around 7:30am. The Mosque grounds were already full of people and there were volunteers outside ushering new arrivals into the mosque. I met Lin Bao on my way in and we went into the washroom to perform wudu. When we were finished, we went into the prayer hall and sat down to wait for the sermon. In the hall, a man was sitting at the front with a microphone chanting “*Alahu akbar*” in repetition. Others in the hall were chanting along with him. After awhile Imam Ibrahim took over and kept that chant going. Inside the prayer hall, I sat with Yusuf and his son.

Yusuf’s father was a KMT veteran who left Yunnan for Burma after the communists came to power. Once in Burma, he became a dentist and opened his own shop. Yusuf was born in Burma along with his seven brothers and sisters. He said that because his family were Muslims from China, their identity cards in Burma stated both Chinese and Muslim. In his youth, it was easy for him to learn about Islam as there were nine mosques in his town. In comparison, he finds it difficult to educate his son and daughter about Islam. At the time of research, his son was studying for his university entrance exams and so had little time to come to the mosque. He mentioned that his daughter, like her mother, only wears the hijab when at the mosque. According to Yusuf, the majority of Muslim women in Taipei do not wear it outside of the mosque. He said that often women who return from the Hajj will wear the hijab all the time and cited his sister as an example. He himself has been on the Hajj twice in his life and would like to go a third time.

At 8:30am, Imam Omar came to the front and the brothers in the hall stood up and moved to form rows. The Eid prayer consisted of two rakaat. Afterwards, Imam Ibrahim gave a sermon

in Mandarin. Imam Omar followed with a sermon in English. Once the sermons were finished, everyone in the hall stood up and embraced each other saying “*Eid mubarak*”. After spending some time socializing outside, Yusuf invited me to join his family in visiting relatives for the day. We made two separate stops and spent a short amount of time at each relative’s home eating and talking.

That there were two separate Eid celebrations in Taipei is a good example of leaders in the community making assertions about Islam based on interpretations they have of Islamic scripture and these assertions being accepted or contested by individual Muslims. Some told me in confidence whether or not they had decided to fast on August 8th. The reasons varied from the physical desire to stop fasting to a theological belief that technology can be followed to determine the date of the new month. The scripture was also interpreted in two different ways. The message is to *see* the new moon. During the Prophet Muhammad’s time, this meant with the naked eye, and so this is the way some say it needs to be done. On the other hand is the argument that Islam has always been a religion priding itself on its scientific sophistication. God would of course have known that technology would develop in a manner that would eventually allow one to see the moon from afar.

By providing ethnographic detail of Muslim life in Taipei, I have been building the argument that Islam there had undergone transformations. These transformations have culminated in an identity change. First, migrations of various Islamic groups to Taipei have altered the make-up of the Muslim community. Secondly, Muslims in Taipei have had increased contact with non-Chinese Muslim influences. Increasingly common are the Muslims who go on the Hajj and those who study Islam overseas. Both groups return with new ideas about Islam and a desire to fully incorporate Islam into their lives.

3.2 From *Huijiao* to Islam: Religious change in Taipei

In this section, I would like to summarize my arguments that Muslim Mainlanders are becoming more Muslim. In order to do this, I will revisit historical aspects of Islam in Taiwan and compare these to the findings of my own research. Lin Chang-kuan (2013), a scholar on Islam in Taiwan, argues that second and third generation Han-speaking Muslims in Taiwan have a stronger sense of identity with Arab-Islam than Chinese-Islam (29). I think that this is an important and justified claim and I will try to explain what he means by it. The Taiwanese Muslims who are influential in the community (work in mosques or for the Chinese Muslim Association) have studied Islam in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia in particular. Also, many second and third generation Taiwanese Muslims who practice Islam come from a higher socio-economic status. Many of them have been on the Hajj, often multiple times. They return with a sense of being part of a global Islamic community. Lastly, the Muslim community in Taipei has grown in diversity. The Yunnanese imams who work in Taipei have been trained in Saudi Arabia. The head imam of the Taipei Grand Mosque is Syrian. Many Muslims from African or Asian Islamic countries have married Native Taiwanese women who have themselves converted to Islam.

A theme which has emerged is the push to “correct” the way Islam is practiced and thought of in Taipei. This is often a topic of conversation and can also be the cause of friction between Muslims in Taipei. I have previously described an incident in which a first generation Mainlander was accused of not praying correctly. This is a significant accusation as many Muslims claim that if prayer is not performed correctly it is nullified. I have also mentioned the growing pressure on women to correctly wear the hijab (so that no hair is showing). Leading this are many converted Native Taiwanese women who are new to Islam and thus take it seriously.

According to Lin (2013), those in Taiwan who are most adamant about teaching their children about the Five Pillars are the inter-married foreign Muslims from Islamic countries and Native Taiwanese converts (35).

As Bowen (2012) has shown, it is less important to define whether or not a practice is Islamic or influenced by local culture, than what these comments say about people's interpretations of Islam. The importance is that many believe those who came from China did not have a good understanding of Islam and that, with the emergence of more educated Muslims, Islam can now be "corrected". As an example of the changing social context in which Muslims find themselves are two very different interpretations of Islam presented by religious leaders. Barbara Pillsbury (1974) recounts the following, which occurred while she was doing fieldwork in Taipei:

With but few exceptions not due to sex, being Hui restricts a woman's behaviour only in dress. Except for a long white hood worn for prayer, no special garment marks her as different from other Chinese. Rather she simple [sic] tends to dress more modestly than non-Muslims. Hui women seldom wear leg-revealing dresses but tend to appear in public in pant suits. The general popularity of the mini-skirt on Taiwan made certain Muslim women extremely critical of the "indecent" dress of other Muslim women which, by normal Chinese standards, would be judged conservative. Leading the criticism is a forty-year-old Khadija Sa who appears in public only in long-sleeved high-collared pant suits, frequently covering her head with a scarf. Even the Ahong¹⁸ perceives her behaviours as extreme, arguing for her to stop pressing other women to dress as she does. "After all, this isn't the T'ang dynasty and it isn't Saudi Arabia either" he tells her, pointing out that Islam permits flexibility in adapting to both time and place (108).

This look at interpretations of the way women should and did dress according to Islam in Taipei is quite revealing. Pillsbury (1973) commented that, aside from a long scarf worn during prayer, Hui women in Taipei dressed the same as other women (108). She points to Khadija Sa's

¹⁸ Ahong is a term used to describe a religious leader in China. There are no longer any Ahong in Taiwan, religious leaders are Imams

provincial origin being Xinjiang as a reason behind her determination to wear a scarf in public (Pillsbury, 1973: 108-9).

As my observations were mostly conducted at a mosque, it is difficult for me to comment on how women dress in public. However, I can compare the statement made by a Muslim leader in the early 1970's to one made by a Muslim leader 40 years later. In 2013, Imam Omar concluded his Eid al-Fitr sermon at the Taipei Grand Mosque by reminding the congregation of Muslims on the importance of the hijab. He said that it is mandatory in Islam for women to wear the hijab in public and that it must be worn in a way which covers all of a woman's hair. He was speaking to the fact that many women wear the hijab loosely when at the mosque, letting hair be visible.

Saida is one Taiwanese Muslim women who is accustomed to wearing the hijab in public. She has been wearing it for years and expressed that she would feel uncomfortable in public without it. For her it has become part of her identity. However, she also recognizes that it may be difficult for others to do the same. She said:

In Taiwan, I have a girlfriend who wore the hijab when looking for a job. The boss said, "if you wear the hijab, I don't want you." She wants to work and to live so she does not wear it. Taiwan is not an Islamic country and Taiwanese society is not open minded. People will see you like that and find it very strange. They don't like it. Sometimes they say impolite things to you. There are a lot of sisters in Islam who want to live and work, and so do not have the opportunity to wear it.

Throughout this research I interviewed many converted Taiwanese women who recounted stories about the difficulties of wearing the hijab in public or at home. One converted Taiwanese woman in her early twenties did not at first wear a hijab to work. When she did build up the courage to wear it to work, she was fired only a few days later. Another converted Taiwanese woman in her twenties graduated from university and is searching for a job. She says

that when filling out job applications she lists her religion as Islam. During interviews, the employers are interested in finding out whether or not she would have to wear the hijab to work. As she does not wear the hijab to job interviews, she tells them that no, she will not have to go to work wearing it. She also stated that interview questions often focused on her religion instead of her job qualifications. A third informant was asked by her employer when she first started working if she could refrain from wearing the hijab to work. She explained that covering her hair would not affect her job productivity. In the end the employer agreed that she could wear it.

Brown's (2004) example of ethnic change has shown us that ethnicity is based on social experience in a group and in relation to others. Changing religions has caused a change of identity from *Huizu* to *Hanzu*. At the same time, the social experience of Taiwanese Muslims who have maintained Islam has also caused a shift away from the *Huizu*. This is due to the changing way in which Islam is understood and interpreted in a local context. In Barbara Pillsbury's (1973) dissertation, she wrote that "all Hui under Heaven are one family" is a commonly stated sentiment in Taipei (73). "In it implies the Golden Rule of Chinese Islam, namely that all Hui are brothers and sisters in a great egalitarian family, she wrote" (Pillsbury, 1973: 73). If this statement was made in Taipei today, it would differentiate Hui Muslims from non-Hui Muslims. All Muslims in Taipei refer to each other as brother and sister; in this sense they are all part of the same family, the Umma. To say that all Hui under heaven are one family is to say that there are more than one family of Muslims. This change in conceptualization is one way that Islam in Taiwan has moved away from being a "Chinese" religion. Another is the belief that Islam was not practiced correctly before.

A common criticism of Chinese Muslims is that they don't understand the Five Pillars of Islam and believe the pork taboo to be the most important guideline. This is something which

both Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese talk about when referring to Hui Muslims who came to Taiwan. Their criticism is founded by Pillsbury (1973), who states that the Hui in Taipei believed abstaining from eating pork to be the main criteria in terms of “doing Hui” (76). Doing Hui was what made someone both a Hui and a Muslim, since being Hui implies both. My argument is that the social experience of practicing Muslims in Taipei does not facilitate this ethnic or religious divide between Muslims. Pillsbury also mentioned that some Hui who have travelled overseas to Islamic countries noticed that the Hui took too seriously the pork taboo: “They feel Chinese Islam deviates most radically from Islam in the Middle East in the preoccupation of the Hui with the proscription against pork” (Pillsbury, 1973: 112). The reason why many who no longer consider themselves Muslim still maintain an aversion to pork can be found in the research of Pillsbury. We have already seen that many Mainlander men married Native Taiwanese women when they arrived in Taiwan. This phenomenon also extends to the many Hui men who married non-Muslim women. In the Hui community this was not deemed such a bad thing; however there was an expectation that the women convert to Islam. This meant that she give up eating pork (Pillsbury, 1973: 135). Many children of these unions learnt about the pork taboo, and little else about Islam.

Hui today admit openly that times are trying for them on Taiwan. Having entered Han society it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible for them to fast during the month of Ramadan. While the government pays for five of them to make the pilgrimage every year, the remainder have neither the means nor the connection for so expensive a journey. But failure to pray, to fast or to make the pilgrimage does not necessarily compromise an individual’s Hui-ness or result in one being cut off from the Hui and crossing over into Han-ism. Eating pork does” (Pillsbury, 1973: 128-9).

As can be seen from this quote, it was due to the social experience of Muslims in Taipei that Islam was interpreted in the way it was. Failing to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, not praying five times daily, or not eating strictly Halal could not have been cause for being

considered out of Islam because the societal context made it too difficult to adhere to these practices. On the other hand, the pork taboo could be maintained as a boundary for religious and ethnic ascription. In the case that one was forced to eat pork because of military duty, this was only seen as a temporary dirtying of one's Hui blood (Pillsbury, 1973). If someone chose to eat pork continually, then he or she was no longer Hui (which also meant no longer Muslim). During Barbara Pillsbury's fieldwork, Taiwan was faced with the reality of country after country severing diplomatic relations with the ROC. The United States sent President Nixon to visit Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1972. In 1971, the ROC had to cede its seat in the United Nations to the People's Republic of China. The Hui community felt a need to be of economic help in Taiwan. Thus, alcohol was served in almost all Muslim restaurants (for non-Muslim customers) and they became more tolerant of eating non-Halal food (Pillsbury, 1973: 140-1).

Of the Muslim restaurants I visited in Taipei and Zhongli, none of them served alcohol and many of them had Halal certificates distributed by the Chinese Muslim Association. Also, many Muslims today do have the means to adhere to the Five Pillars of Islam. This has raised the bar on what expected of Muslims in Taipei. I predict that it will become increasingly difficult for Mainlanders to practice Islam in Taiwan as the first generation Hui did. They will be pushed to either become "stricter" in their faith or more will choose to leave, feeling disconnected from the Islam which is practiced.

As I have previously mentioned, the traditional way to translate the word "Islam" into Mandarin has been *Huijiao* (Hui religion). *Huijiao tu* are Hui religion disciples. Being a member of the Hui *minzu* refers to both a religious and ethnic identity. Because of the divide which the term Hui creates between those who identify as such and those who do not, it is a common now is to refer to Islam as *yisilan jiao*, and Muslims as *Musilin*, both phonetic translations. These

glosses are used when speaking in Mandarin, however it is also more common for all Muslims in Taipei to use the Arabic words *Islam* and *Muslim*. In the past, there have also been cases in which Chinese Muslims wanted to do away with the translation *Huijiao*. As noted Dru Gladney, “Djamal al-Din Bai Shouyi, the famous Hui Marxist historian, was the first to argue persuasively that ‘Islam’ should be glossed in Chinese as ‘*Yisilan jiao*’ (Islam), not the Hui religion (*Hui jiao*)” (Gladney, 1998: 30). Bai argued that not all Hui believed in Islam; many only followed the pork taboo. Those who did follow Islam believed in a world religion, not a Chinese religion (Gladney, 1998: 30).

Pillsbury (1973) also noted that some Hui in Taiwan would return from the Hajj with a different view of Islam. This was something I found in my research as well. Those whom I interviewed about their experience praying in Mecca said that being around so many Muslims from around the world caused feelings of belonging to a global Islam. During my research in Taipei, I did not hear anyone refer to a Hui family. However, I frequently heard “we are all Muslim” (*women dou shi musulin*). That they believe Islam, as it was practiced in Taiwan in the past, was mixed with local Chinese culture and that there is a desire to learn about Islam “correctly”, displays a shifting understanding of Islam. Also, the anxiety which many display on the difficulties of teaching Islam to their children show a self-conceptualization of belonging to a religious minority, Muslims of the Umma living in Taiwan. This is opposed to the anxiety shown by first generation Hui, which was focused on the fear of members leaving the *Huizu* and being assimilated into the *Hanzu* (Pillsbury, 1973: 266-267). It is for this reason which I argue that, although many second and third generation Mainlanders no longer practice Islam, those who do are becoming “more Muslim” in identity. In order continue with the description of Taiwan’s Muslims, I will now discuss how Taiwanese Muslims see themselves as Taiwanese. This is also

in relation to the changing social context in which these Muslims find themselves, and the varying social experiences thus lived.

Chapter 4: Taiwanese Mainlanders

As Chinese migrants and their descendants transformed from being sojourners to Chinese of different nationalities, they acquire new perceptions of themselves in relation to their countries of residence and to China. Their identities are shaped by local national experiences and transnational as well as global processes. The migration, localization and transnational experiences created multiple identities (Tan, 2007: 2).

In the above quote, Tan Chee-Beng is referring to the experience of overseas Chinese relating to migration and identity. He most likely did not envision Taiwan's Mainlanders when describing the process of identifying as a national of Chinese origin. However, I would argue that this is the process through which Mainlanders in Taiwan are now undergoing. The multiple identities relating to being ethnically Chinese while experiencing changes of nationality seems to fit the case of Mainlanders forging their identities as Taiwanese while maintaining that they are part of a larger collective.

Since the beginning of the 1990's, a discourse around four ethnic categories has influenced the social, political and academic landscape in Taiwan. This has led to vast literature on the differences between these groups. In particular a dichotomy which opposes the Hoklo and Hakka "native" Taiwanese (*Benshengren*) and "Mainlanders" (*Waishengren*) has persisted. Recently however, there has been a push to question these categories and whether or not it is productive to continue to use them as ethnic classifiers (Rigger, 1999, 2006; Yang & Chang, 2010; Le Pesant, 2011). Le Pesant (2011) argues that dividing the Taiwanese population into four ethnic categories has three pitfalls. First, that individual's complex life experiences and social realities may not match the clear-cut distinctions being analysed. This argument was first put forth by Yang and Chang (2010). They argued that in particular, the category of *Waishengren* was too all-encompassing.

[T]he ethnicity framework leads to homogenization and generalization – seeing civil war migrants and their offspring as a privileged ruling minority and overlooking the important class difference within as well as the complex relationship between KMT party-state and the migrant community in the past. Furthermore, human agency is also absent from most studies based on ethnicity (Yang and Chang, 2010: 118).

The study in particular which they looked at was the one done by Hu (1989), which looked at KMT veterans as an impoverished sub-ethnic category. Hu (1989) argued that the life experiences of these veterans led to thinking themselves as distinct from other *Waishengren*. The high-ranking veterans who belonged to a higher socio-economic category, and therefore may have been “privileged” were not part of this veteran ethnic group. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, the Native Taiwanese felt less restricted in asserting their grievances with the ruling KMT. This is partly why the study of four distinct ethnic groups did not take off until the early 1990’s. Hu (1989) also points to the lifting of martial law as the time when veterans began to assert their grievances with the government. For these men who were called *rongmin* (glorious citizens) by Chiang Kai-shek, they had a complex totemic attachment to him. Their military father figure failed to bring them back to China and did not let them contact mainland relatives for over 30 years (Hu, 1989: 258). Hu (1989) points to the ritual nature of *rongmin* protests as evidence that they are distinct from other *Waishengren* (263).

Also, Pillsbury (1973) has shown, although it was not her intent, that Muslims did also constitute a *Waishengren* sub-ethnic category. She makes clear the ethnic boundaries which set the Hui apart from others in Taiwan. These boundaries are the belief in one God, having “pure Hui blood”, and refraining from eating pork. They furthermore displayed their ethnic distinction in the anxiety they showed towards members becoming Han. This is important because to them the Han were both *Waishengren* and *Benshengren*. It is not evident anywhere in Pillsbury’s

dissertation that the Hui felt a stronger connection to other *Waishengren* than they did to *Benshengren*. Both groups were the “other” because they did not have pure Hui blood.

The second criticism presented by Le Pesant (2011) is to point out that ethnic groups are social constructions and so should not be reified (135). It is important to remember that ascription by others does not always align with self-ascription. This is something which has long been recognized in anthropology, and is why anthropologists carry out reflexive fieldwork. Participant observation, and more recently life history narratives, are research methods which have been designed with the principle of gaining an emic perspective. The third pitfall presented is that ethnic categories are never static. They can change or even disappear if the cultural or symbolic meanings attached to membership change or are lost from generation to generation (Gans, 1979). I have already shown in this study that this is exactly what has happened to the Hui *minzu* distinction. Muslims in Taiwan no longer believe their blood sets them apart from other Muslims or non-Muslims. They also do not believe that by eating pork, one dirties their blood and is no longer Hui. The changing social experience of subsequent generations has brought them a new understanding of what it means to be Muslim. What I argue in this section is that it has also changed their perception on what it means to belong to an ethnicity or nationality. As is pointed out in this criticism, generations can have various social memories which facilitate the persistence of ethnic boundaries. This is the reason I have chosen to compare those who were born in China to those who were born in Taiwan. Throughout interviews, being born in Taiwan was a distinction which was brought up repeatedly.

In the study conducted by Le Pesant (2011), he is looking, at what he refers to as the third generation’s attitudes towards ethnicity. The third generation are those who were born in the 1980’s, and have only known democracy in Taiwan. He refers to this group as Taiwanese and

does not differentiate between the four ethnic categories. His research was carried out in the form of questionnaires targeting the relevance that these categories have in the lives Taiwanese youth.

Le Pesant (2011) concludes in his study that,

The data presented in the two preceding sections allow the assertion that ethnic groupness seems to be progressively occluded by another form of more directly territorialized identity – a Taiwanese national identity. In terms of group boundary-making and solidarity, what really matters to these students is their perceived common life experience as individuals who were all born in and grew up in Taiwan, a sovereign, multicultural country which may be part of a larger *Chinese/ Huaren cultural sphere* but which is nevertheless limited to Taiwan and its population (152).

The findings of my research support this statement. Following Barth's definition of ethnic groups, *the Chinese/ Huaren sphere* is a category with ethnic boundaries which encompass citizens of China and Taiwan. It is not that ethnic divides are disappearing in Taiwan, however.

Mainlanders are shaping their collective identity in a way which categorizes all Chinese as *Huaren*, while distancing themselves from citizens of the PRC because they are not Taiwanese.

Second and third generation *Waishengren* do recognize the common four ethnic categories of Taiwan, however they reject them in order to assert their sense of belonging in Taiwan. This means asserting a dual identity of being both Chinese and Taiwanese.

4.1: Chinese as an Ethnic category in Taiwan

When I hear friends on the street, I can't really tell who is Waishengren and who is Benshengren. It's a political thing, when they want to get votes, politicians will say Waishengren are like this and Benshengren are like that. And then citizens will start to notice differences. If the politicians don't say this, than Taiwanese people will be fine...I think everyone is the same, same language, same culture, both Benshengren and Waishengren, culture is all Chinese.

2nd generation Muslim from the mainland – active Muslim

For me, I don't care about Waishengren. The difference of Waishengren and Benshengren is particularly emphasized among the political parties. In my opinion, this is the result of political struggle- to win votes. For 2nd generation people, we don't reject Benshengren. In our social circles, we meet many Benshengren in schools. We can even speak their language, Taiwanese, so we don't really care if she/he is Waishengren or

Benshengren when we make friends. In my father's age, the difference of Waishengren and Benshengren is more obvious. However, the current group differentiation is from the power struggle of politics.

2nd generation Muslim from the mainland – does not practice Islam

I have previously used a definition of ethnicity provided by Mark Elliot, “the social organization and political assertion of difference perceived to inhere in culturally bounded, descent-based categories” (2006: 34). As these two quotes show, there is a sense among *Waishengren* that culturally, they are Chinese, as are the *Benshengren*. As can be seen, the notion of cultural difference is often made tangible through language. Taiwan has a history of language being a contested domain. When the KMT arrived in Taiwan, many Mainlanders were disdainful of Japanese customs in Taiwanese society. Fresh in their collective memory was the invasion of China, particularly of Nanjing. The promotion of the Japanese language during the colonial period was replaced by the need to learn Mandarin. Subsequently, Japanese has been used as a way for local Taiwanese to assert anti-Chinese sentiment (Simon, 2003: 123). The separation of languages along the lines of Hokkien (Taiwanese), Hakka, various aboriginal languages and Mandarin played a definite role in the demarcation of ethnic identity. When the KMT government arrived in Taiwan, Mandarin was imposed as the national language. The fact the few Taiwanese spoke Mandarin was used the KMT as a mechanism for maintaining political power through the justification that government positions required national language proficiency.

Taylor (1989) argues that language is important to identity because it dictates how we relate to members of our group (35). In Taiwan today, Mandarin is the dominant language of politics, media, and education. The importance of Taiwanese as a language for youth in Taiwan has decreased as few on the island cannot speak Mandarin. As a sign of this, the student led protests on the cross-strait agreement were pro-Taiwanese, and were carried out with rallies conducted in Mandarin.

It is this cultural sameness between *Waishengren* and *Benshengren* which is used to express that they are not of different ethnic origins. One second generation Mainlander asserted that both *Waishengren* and *Benshengren* came from China, and that the Austronesians were the true “native” group. As I showed in Chapter Two, a Chinese ethnic identity is usually expressed as either *Zhongguo ren* or *Hua ren*. Both of these terms have political connotations. As Melissa Brown (2004) points out, *Zhongguo ren* can often be associated with PRC citizenry (1). This is due to *Zhongguo* as being the Mandarin word for the country of China. On the other hand, *Hua* was employed by Sun Yat-sen to assert that the “Five peoples of China” were all Chinese. It was also used by the Chen Shui-bian in an attempt to unify the Taiwanese people under a common ethnic category (Damm, 2011: 227).

Ethnicity is based on boundaries which separate groups of people. One of these boundaries may be based on perceived biological descent-based categories. The idea of being Chinese, or *Hua*, relates to an ancestry which originates in the *neidi* (inner lands) of China proper. The Mainlanders believe that they share this descent and cultural category with Chinese regardless of where they live. There is also evidence that many Native Taiwanese believe a Chinese ethnicity is something which persists in Taiwan. “For most Taiwanese, admitting that their island is part of China in a historical and cultural sense is not the same as accepting a ‘one country, two systems’ formula for unification” (Rigger, 1999, p. 551). What Rigger is critiquing is that the identity debate has been framed around unification and independence. This does not necessary translate to a Chinese or Taiwanese oppositional identity (Rigger, 1999).

While Taiwanese Muslims may assert that they share a Chinese ethnicity with Chinese across the globe, they still actively maintain that there is a boundary between themselves and those living in China. It is in this practice of designating PRC citizens as outside the Taiwanese


group boundary that second and third generation *Waishengren* assert that they are Taiwanese. They believe the divide between the Native Taiwanese and Mainlanders to be a political fabrication. Instead they are indeed united through a Chinese ethnic culture and a Taiwanese nationality. Therefore, I agree with Shen (2010) that a “double identity” as Chinese and Taiwanese has emerged for Mainlanders in Taiwan. A third generation Taiwanese Muslim expressed his own identity as such “my language and the culture are like China but I am born in Taiwan so I am Taiwanese, also I lived in Taiwan for 30 years, so I have a double identity.” Here is another quote from a second generation Taiwanese Muslim, “it is political, if you say *Waishengren* we think we are Chinese from Mainland China, however I was born in Taiwan so I am also Taiwanese, however my Taiwanese is not good”. Supporting these points are the statistics taken by National Chengchi University on self-ascription as Taiwanese and Chinese. Of note is the steady decline of those who identify as *Chinese only*, down from 25.5% in 1992 to 3.6% in 2013 (figure 2). This drastic decrease is evident in the way Muslims spoke to me about their identity as Taiwanese. It was evident that although they believe in a fundamental Chinese ethnic core, they still speak about *us* as being Taiwanese and the Chinese in China as being *them*.

4.2: Fundamentally Taiwanese

Benedict Anderson (2006) describes a nation as an imagined political community. It is also limited by its borders (6). We can take this as a point of departure when comparing ethnic and national groups. Ethnicities have boundaries, based on a perceived culture and common descent. Nations have borders which are finite, not by their perceived traits, but as political communities. Although I recognize that this simplistic view may not hold in all situations, I believe it to be a useful starting point in relation to the findings of this study. Le Pesant (2011) has shown that being Taiwanese is a national category directly linked to sentiments of belonging

to Taiwan (152). From my experience with young Muslim *Waishengren*, they display this sense of belonging to Taiwan.

Figure 2



Source: <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166>

Taiwanese nationality is often expressed by Mainlanders through place of birth and citizenship. The idea of a passport, the Republic of China (with the addition of the word Taiwan as of 2003), designating national status was a common theme during this research. When speaking about the passport, Wang (2004) emphasises the importance in having paper identification in order to show people who we “really” are (357). Torpey (2000) shows how the

history of the passport is linked to the development of the nation-state. The passport is a means by which the state can limit travel and also a way to control the “identity” of groups of people (Torpey, 2000: 4). By using the passport as a mechanism of representation and belonging, the state shapes the self-image of its citizenry while at the same time shaping recognition by others (Krasner, 1998). Recognizing the importance of the passport, some pro-independence groups have created fake passports with various national titles such as “The Republic of Taiwan” (Wang, 2004). When speaking about the passport and identity, one Mainlander born in China said “I use the Taiwan passport to enter China and Taiwan... I also have the home return permit issued by China... we Mainlanders] are special, the Mainland regards us as Taiwanese and the Taiwanese regard us as Mainlanders.” Thinking about the importance of state recognition through citizenship exemplified by passports, it is quite difficult to imagine second or third generation Mainlanders born in Taiwan not identifying as Taiwanese. In fact it is offensive to Mainlanders to have it implied that they are somehow lacking a Taiwanese identity.

While conducting a 2007 survey on identity, Stéphane Corcuff (2011b) found that some Mainlanders chose not to participate because the label implies an ethnic distinction between Chinese and Taiwanese (117). In that same study he noticed a decline (compared to his 1997 survey) in the self-ascription as a Mainlander (2011: 120). He points to the fact that the generation born between 1979 and 1992 was not a part of the 1997 survey. In the 2007 survey, only 28 percent of this group considered themselves “Mainlanders” (Corcuff, 2011b: 120). A student of Corcuff, Yin Ming (2010), carried out a M.A. thesis and found that many third generation Mainlanders rejected the label. In another study, Corcuff (2011a) traces the changing perception of Mainlanders towards being identified as such. He begins with:

The existence in Taiwan of a Mainlander population, not to mention a Mainlander ‘ethnic group’, has been increasingly contested in Taiwanese society, with issues centering on the difficulty defining who a Mainlander is, the attributes of a Mainlander, the passing away of the old generation of Mainlanders, and the low level of identification of the younger ones with a disputed ethnic label. The fact that all in Taiwan have nevertheless continued so far to use the term ‘Mainlanders’ (*waishengren*) is indicative of a perceived social phenomenon (34).

This quote demonstrates that in Taiwan there seems to be a shift away from focusing on the *Waishengren/Benshengren* contrast towards something which is much more focused on Chinese/Taiwanese markers (Corcuff, 2011a). Shelley Rigger was one of the first researchers to question whether an ethnic division along the lines of Taiwanese and Mainlanders was really so important to the people of Taiwan (Rigger, 1999). She points out that by framing the identity debate around unification versus independence, Taiwanese people are being given a false choice; one that is inherently political. She emphasizes that to operationalize identity through this dichotomy neglects the moderate view maintained by most Taiwanese people (Rigger, 1999: 539).

In the 1998 Taipei mayoral campaign, Lee Teng-hui expressed the idea of a new Taiwanese identity which encompassed both Mainlanders and local Taiwanese. Melissa Brown (2004) believes that Lee was simply pointing out a change which had occurred in Taiwan (12). She illustrates her point by telling a story about a Mainlander who, upon returning from a trip to China which she found lacking, asserted her pride in being Taiwanese (12). This is something I also frequently encountered during my research among the Taiwanese Muslims in Taipei. When asked if he would like to live in China, one second generation Mainlander’s response was “I don’t have the chance because for them I am a foreigner. I don’t have a house there, I have travelled many times there and I am not familiar with their lifestyles, there are differences between the Chinese there and the *waishengren* here. I am afraid I am not accustomed to the life

there". A few other Mainlanders mentioned being surprised by the lack of morals in China. In Taiwan, on the other hand, sound morals have persisted. Speaking about China in this way asserts their identities as Taiwanese. Those who have returned to China for visits express a difference between themselves and the Chinese in the PRC. They often blame this on the Communist government and the harsh lives many had to live through. Some Taiwanese Muslims even spoke with regret that Muslims in China did not have the same freedom to practice their religion. They also blame this on Communist policy and see it as a reason that China's Islam is different. Some Muslim Mainlanders who have travelled to China mentioned that the Islam they saw there was influenced by local culture. One woman mentioned that women do not wear the hijab and that they would put flowers on the graves, a sign of Chinese culture.

These claims of a moral difference between Chinese and Taiwanese are what make a Taiwanese identity more important for Mainlanders. For Charles Taylor (1989), an individual's identity is highly influenced by the moral domain (35). As can be seen by the statements made on moral differences between the two countries, a Taiwanese identity is important to *Waishengren*.

Identity is also often based on the mobilisation of collective memory. It has been these mobilisations, especially 2:28 commemorations, which have kept a distance between the *Waishengren* and *Benshengren* (Simon, 2003). As can be seen in Quebec, these memories can be extremely resilient. The defeat of the French to the English at the Plains of Abraham is a narrative which reinforces the difference between Quebec and the other provinces. The eventual disappearance of a Mainlander ethnic identity is by no means just a matter of time. However what choice do they have but to try and push for acceptance as Taiwanese? Stuck in the middle between being Mainlanders in Taiwan and Taiwanese in Mainland China, it is no

wonder that a national self-ascription as Taiwanese has emerged while the conceptualization of an ethnic Chinese category is called upon to maintain a membership in an imagined boundary of recognition beyond the borders of the island. The generations of *Waishengren* who were old enough to understand the implications of the rise of Taiwanese nationalism don't want to be painted as the outsiders in that framework. Instead, they position themselves as Taiwanese. Furthermore I believe that this question has never been important to the generation pointed out by Corcuff as being born between 1979 and 1992. Instead they've grown up *knowing* they are Taiwanese (Corcuff, 2011b; Le Pesant, 2011). There is also evidence that Taiwanese youth in general do not view the Mainlander and Native Taiwanese divide as important. The study conducted by Le Pesant (2011) on Taiwanese students, asserts this sense of being Taiwanese but also a larger "Chinese/ Hua cultural sphere" (152). Taiwanese youth under thirty years of age whom I interviewed seemed unsure of how to answer when I asked if they or their parents were *Waishengren* or *Benshengren*. These distinctions seem far from their lived social realities. It is important to remember that the Mandarin equivalent of "Mainlander", *waishengren*, is a concept which has been in the Chinese language long before being employed as an ethnic category. The idea of a *waishengren* is simply someone from outside the province, so how are "Mainlanders" who are not from outside the province to understand the meaning of this term?

I have put primacy over the way in which people speak about, and self-describe their own identities because to try and observe Taiwanese-ness or Chinese-ness would be going down the wrong path. There is no such thing as a Chinese or Taiwanese homogenous culture which is waiting to be observed. In her study on Yunnanese living in Thailand, Hill (2010) avoids describing assimilation into a sino-Thai culture for the same reasons as it would be unproductive to talk about Mainlanders assimilating into Taiwanese culture. Instead I have focused on an

analysis of how Taiwanese Muslims talk about being Chinese, Taiwanese or *Waishengren*. This has been a useful tool in that it has shown how they describe themselves in relation to these categories. They understand that the Mainlander label still plays a role in the identity politics of Taiwan, and therefore still has classificatory power. It is for this reason that rejecting the label is a legitimate expression of one's own identity. By rejecting the label of "Mainlander", Taiwanese Muslims assert that they are Taiwanese and avoid ascribing themselves as culturally different from the Native Taiwanese.

Conclusion

In theorising about identity, this thesis has aimed to determine how second and third generation Taiwanese Muslims understand their religion, ethnicity and nationality. I see these identities as collective social constructions, which are derived from meaning made relevant through social experience. These interpretations are also mediated through social, economic, and political factors. By identifying as a Muslim and acting in certain ways, an individual is enacting Islam, and therefore expressing what they take to be Islamic. I have shown in this thesis that these interpretations and the actions which accompany them have changed since Mainlanders first came to Taiwan. What I have also shown is that these meanings associated with what it means to be Muslim have changed due to changing social experiences in Taiwan.

The previous sentiments about identity can be coupled with the idea that they are always formed in relations to others. Throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that the validity of this theory, while also given evidence of how groups relate to others can change with a changing social context. This was demonstrated in the work of Melissa Brown (2004), who showed how Plains Aborigines became Han. I will conclude with a review of the examples I have provided of similar identity changes.

As Pillsbury (1973) has shown, the Muslims who arrived in Taiwan in 1949 were a distinct ethnic group. They had recently been designated as Hui in China by Sun Yat-sen. When they arrived on the island, they had to adapt their religious beliefs in order to maintain this identity. They saw the Han as the other and believed that what separated them was their distinct blood, which was mixed with the early Muslim settlers in China. Lin (2013) has pointed out that as these Muslims connected more with Arab-Islam, they gradually moved away from an ethnic minority view to a religious minority view (29). This was coupled alongside the

conceptualization of themselves as part of the global Islamic religion in which all other Muslims are brothers and sisters. I have argued that this was due to several factors which are related to increased exposure with various forms of Islam. Firstly, migrations of various Muslim groups seen to have a better understanding and a stricter Islamic practice. Secondly, increased contact with Muslims outside of Taiwan through pilgrimages and study abroad.

This transformation has occurred, and may have been facilitated, by a loss of Islamic practice from second and third generation Mainlanders. Those who do practice Islam in Taiwan have personal motivations for doing so and have chosen to adapt their religious practices. This has motivated a desire to try and practice a “correct” form of Islam and a recognition that in China, Islam has incorporated many “Chinese” practices.

Another change which has occurred is the way in which Taiwanese Muslims speak about non-members. The Hui were fearful that many would become assimilated into Han (Pillsbury, 1973). As I have shown in my interviews, first generation Hui are saddened that the many Hui no longer practice Islam and have become Han. This is in contrast to Muslims who speak about non-Muslims as different because of their different religious beliefs. The anxiety which many spoke about was their fear of more children not maintaining Islamic practices. They wish there was an Islamic school to which they could send their children. The Taiwanese Muslims are also concerned with converting non-Muslims into the religion. Spreading the religion of Islam is one of its fundamental tenets.

Similarly, Mainlanders in Taiwan have adopted Taiwanese identities. Prior to democratization, Mainlanders at the helm of the KMT government emphasized that Taiwan was only a temporary stop and that their return to China was imminent. They enforced the policy that all Chinese regardless of where they lived were culturally and ethnically homogenous and that

this applied to the Native Taiwanese as well. Since the lifting of martial law, the Native Taiwanese have more and more been able to assert themselves as Taiwanese. This has occurred while second and third generations of Mainlanders have been born on the island and see their national identities as linked to their place of birth.

Those Mainlanders whom I interviewed who have been to China spoke about the cultural differences between the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As many Mainlanders feel that Taiwan's democratization has allowed them to live better lives than the PRC Chinese, Muslim Mainlanders also describe a religious freedom which is not shared by Muslims in China. It is clear the Mainlanders in Taiwan feel gratitude towards being Taiwanese.

The desire to emphasize a Taiwanese identity has also manifested itself in the Muslim community. Mourad Ma is a second generation Taiwanese Muslim whose father was a Mainlander from Qinghai and whose mother is a Native Taiwanese. Due to its historical roots in China, the Chinese Muslim Association still maintains the Mandarin name the "Zhongguo Huijiao Xiehui" (中國回教協會)¹⁹. In the name we can see the implication of it being a mainland Chinese organization. The probable explanation for this is that the CMA maintained close ties with the KMT after arriving in Taiwan. They would have thus adopted the political stance that they were the rightful government of China (*Zhongguo*). In response to this, and in order to articulate a stronger sense that the Muslim community in Taiwan was Taiwanese, Mourad, along with others, attempted to form the Taiwanese Muslim Association. It was due to differences in visions for the new association that it was never officially formed.

¹⁹ The bimonthly magazine publish by the CMA is also still titled "Islam in China", with a picture of Taiwan in the lower right corner.

Nevertheless, this provides a case in which there was an attempt to express a Muslim Taiwanese identity. From the analysis presented in this research, a link can be drawn between increasing Muslim and Taiwanese identities. Both these identity transformations are movements away from a heritage deemed to originate in China. In both cases, global Islamic and nationalistic Taiwanese, Mainlanders are expressing nationalistic sentiments in that they are forming identities which are moving beyond the Chinese heritage which originally came with them from the Mainland. I have provided much evidence throughout the thesis of Taiwanese Muslims enacting anti-Chinese sentiments, both religiously and nationally.

I have argued throughout the thesis that Islam in Taiwan is distinctly Taiwanese. I have done such with the belief that Islam is always adopted in meaningful ways by people in certain contexts. This was first put forth by Geertz (1968) when he compared Islam in Morocco and Indonesia. Since this breakthrough study various scholars have argued that Islam should be seen as a set of contextually interpreted practices (Asad, 1986; Sayyid, 2003; Volpi, 2010; Bowen 2012). The arguments put forth in this thesis have shown that Islam in Taiwan has adapted to fit the local context. This has made it uniquely Taiwanese.

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